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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The July 1, 1982 census announced that with 1,008,288,000
people, China5 had become the first country to pass one billion,
and had gained 314 million in the 18 years since the last census
in 1964. The annual average increase since 1964 had been 17.4
million people, or 2.1 percent. No other country comes close to
China in population size. To slow down the rate of population
growth rate in order to cope with problems emerging from its fast
growing population, the government launched the most ambitious
family planning campaign in the world. A specific policy in this
campaign is to limit each couple to only one child. If this
policy is successful, China would stabilize its population at 1.2
billion, a target announced in 1979, by the end of the century or
soon after. The ultimate goal set up in 1979 is to achieve zero
population growth by the year 2000. 6 However, according to a
population projection, 7 if the one-child-per-family policy can be
strictly and successfully implemented, the average population
growth rate in the year 2010 will be -2 per thousand, and will
5
. China in this paper means the China mainland, or the
People's Republic of China.
6
. Qian Xinzhong, "Discussion on Family Planning", Beijing
Review , vol. 22, no. 28, 1979
7
. Song Jian, Tian Xuyuan, Population Projection and
Population Control , Beijing: 1982, (in Chinese). Details of the
projection are reported in chapter five.
decline thereafter. The impact of such a rapid reduction in
population growth rate may in fact lead to unforeseen
demographic, social and economic problems in the near future.
For example, such a policy would make the Chinese population the
most aged one in the world. 8 Frequent reports of interference of
human rights in China as the direct result of the one-child-per-
family policy implemented in 1979 has drawn worldwide concern.
Many previous studies of Chinese population policy either
have emphasized the positive necessity of population control
while ignoring the human rights and the aggregate social welfare
aspects of the policy, or have emphasized the moral side of the
problem while ignoring population pressure in China. Main
attention has been focused on how population policy itself
affects target population. Little work has been done beyond
official guidelines and limitations to study the coercive or
incentive mechanisms of population control program, the impact of
economic policy and its effectiveness on people's preference for
children and on the extent of success of population planning
program. In addition, the negative impact of the one-child
policy is not widely studied.
2. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this paper are to discuss the current
8
. Wu Cangping, "Some Population Problems That Should be
Deliberated Upon at an Early Stage", World Economic Herald , no.
165, 1983 and "The Two Problems Which We Should Pay Attention
to", Economic Digest , no. 4, 1984.
population policy in China, and to discuss an alternative policy
option. The current One-Child policy in China and its impact on
Chinese economic development will be discussed. More
specifically, I will:
1) review the main streams of population theory;
2) discuss China's population in a historical
perspective;
3) discuss China's population policy in a historical
perspective;
4) discuss the One-Child-Per-Family policy, including its
shortcomings, its interference with human rights, and the
resistance to the policy;
5) present population trends and projections to examine
issues related to population size and age structure, especially
population aging in China;
6) discuss the effects of the One-Child policy on China's
economic development by using a simple economic growth model ; and
7) present some alternative policy options in population
control
.
3. LIMITATIONS
As a new discipline, Chinese population research is hampered
by inadequacies in the underlying theory as well as
methodological shortcomings. An additional problem is the severe
shortage of information, especially statistical data. It is
extremely difficult to get relevant, up-to-date, information,
especially on the negative aspects of the current population
policy. Data and information from unofficial channels are
inappropriate to be referenced. For these reasons, the majority
of references in this paper are to publications in western
countries. Some direct observations are also reported in the
paper.
4. CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY
The study concludes that although the current one-child-
per-family policy in China is making and will make progress on
reaching its target of slowig population growth, it impedes the
realization of the national governing principles of this
socialist country to satisfy people's growing material and
cultural demands and to maximize social welfare of all the
people, and it impedes the development planning objectives of
social justice, rapid economic growth and sustained development.
The policy causes frustration, human misery and will have a
sustained negative impact on China's long-run modernization
plans, despite efforts made to promote economic development. The
result of the study indicates that under the current one-child-
per-family policy, China will face sharp population decline, and
accompanied problems such as population aging and labor shortage
relative to the number of dependents. The study also suggests
that instead of putting all emphasis in population control
itself, China should adopt a more open and liberal economic
policy. This will not only promote voluntary family planning,
public social security system and internal migration, but will
also help solve the ultimate problem of economic backwardness.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
1. SCHOOL OF THOUGHT 1: RAPID POPULATION GROWTH CONTRIBUTES TO
POVERTY AND ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS
The argument that rapid population growth is harmful is
supported by two points of view. First, it is argued that, in
third world nations, food production and economic growth often
cannot keep up with the needs of rapidly-growing populations.
The most famous representative of this school, Thomas Robert
Malthus, pointed out:
Population, when unchecked, increases in
a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only
in an arithmetical ratio. . . . This implies a
strong and constantly operating check on population
from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty
must fall somewhere and must necessarily be severely
felt by a large portion of mankind '
U Thant, the former secretary general of the United Nations,
expressed the viewpoint that rapid population growth hinders
economic development:
There is ever-increasing realization that
too rapid population growth constitutes a major
obstacle to education and the promotion of the
welfare of the young in general, the attainment
of adequate standards of health, the chance of
earning a decent living, and in many cases even the
availability of food at subsistence level. We must
conclude from the demographic projections that the
task of providing opportunities for the world's as
yet unborn children and developing their talents
and their capabilities to the full appears in a
number of countries well-nigh insuperable, unless
9
. T. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population
,
ed. Phlip Appleman (New York: W.W.Norton, 1976)
.
action is taken to moderate the population growth
rate. 10
Secondly, it is argued that curbing population growth is
necessary to avoid damage to the environment. Paul Ehrlich and
his colleagues insist that if we do not limit population, we are
headed for a global catastrophe:
The nature of exponential growth is such that
limits can be approached with surprising suddenness.
The likelihood of overshooting such a limit, with
catastrophic results, is made even greater by (a) the
momentum of human population growth, (b) by the delays
between cause and effect in many environmental systems,
and, (c) by the fact that some kinds of damage are
irreversible by time they are visible.... 11
They believe that the momentum of human population growth has two
origins. First, attitudes toward childbearing have deep
biological and cultural roots, and therefore resist change.
Second, today's population is heavily weighted with young people.
This means that there are far more young people who will soon be
reproducing than there are old people who will be dying. Thus,
even if every pair of parents in the world had only enough
children to replace themselves, the present imbalance between
young and old would cause the population to grow for another 50
to 70 years before it leveled off. This phenomenon is called
population "momentum"
.
There are some who claim that we cannot continue to be "our
10
. United Nations, Secretariat, Text of Statement by
Secretary-General. U Thant. at Opening of Orientation Course for
Population Programme Officers (Press Release SG/SM/1055,
SOC/3624), 14 January 1969.
11
. P. R. Ehrlich, Human Ecology (San Francisco: W. H.
Freeman, 1973)
.
brother's keeper" if the consequence is no survival for everyone.
Garrett Hardin holds another alternative, that is, not to lower
death rate, because "we must recognize the limited capacity of
any lifeboat....". 12
2. SCHOOL OF THOUGHT 2 : POPULATION GROWTH DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE
TO POVERTY
Proponents of this school of population theory offer various
points of view: (1) Population growth is a blessing to humanity;
(2) Plenty of food is available, new resources will be
discovered, and these will continue for the foreseeable future;
(3) Hunger and poverty result from structural imbalances in the
society, so the focus should be on these imbalances rather than
on population control; (4) Hunger and poverty are caused by
consumption patterns of the rich.
Julian Simon argues that more people means more knowledge.
"Because improvements—their invention and their adoption—come
from people, it seems reasonable to assume that the amount of
improvement depends in large measure on the number of people
available." 13 He and other proponents believe that people, even
poor people, are assets, at least when they are given enough
incentives and means to work. Population is a stock of creators
12
. G. Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping
the Poor", Psycholocrv Today . September 1974.
13
. Julian L. Simon, "The Case for More People", American
Demographics
. 1, no. 10 (November-December 1979).
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of new knowledge. Thus an increase of population will mean
additional knowledge-creators. The productive effect of
increments to knowledge will contribute to the aggregate output
as well as output per capita. His judgment about the welfare of
a community depends both on the average income per person and on
the number of people who partake of that standard of living.
Simon indicates that "moderate population growth has positive
effects on the standard of living in the long run after, say, 3
to 100 years, in both more developed and less-developed
countries-as compared to a stationary population and to very fast
population growth." 14 He holds that previous studies in the area
of population growth and economic development are flawed, because
they have placed too much weight on the present, relative to the
future. He states, "any one who takes a long run view and gives
high weight to the welfare of future generations should prefer a
growing population to a stationary one now or in the near
future." I believe that the difference among economists on the
population growth problem are exaggerated. Simon's position has
been misunderstood. He thinks that a moderate growth rate is
preferable to a zero, or a high growth rate. The problem is that
Simon did not give an operational definition of what he meant by
moderate growth, nor is any empirical information provided.
Without precise definition, people have problems understanding
each other on what is meant by "low", "high", and "moderate". It
14
. Julian L. Simon, The Ultimate Resource . (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1981)
.
is true that the probability of creating more geniuses is
positively related to the size of a population, but it seems to
me that it may be too simple and too naive to conclude that more
people means more geniuses and more inventions. People cannot
become geniuses naturally without training and education. If
Simon's view is correct, we should expect to see more geniuses in
the world's most populous developing countries than in the less
populous developed countries. An interesting phenomenon is that
many excellent scholars and students from developing countries
become more successful in the developed countries than in their
own. Many factors are responsible for this, but one reason is
probably that a person's potential can be well developed only
with better support. I believe that Simon's essential point is
that population is not the main factor contributing to poverty
and economic backwardness. Instead, social and economic policies
and other factors restrict the full utilization of people's
productivity. People cannot simply become productive with their
bare hands.
Peter Bauer and Basil Yamey, like Simon, believe that an
increased population growth rate indicates an increased standard
of living: "The so-called population explosion is the result of
sharp fall in mortality, unaccompanied by corresponding decline
in birth rate." 15 They also think that per capita income is not
15
. P. Bauer and B. Yamey, "The Third World and the West:
An Economic Perspective", The Third World: Premises of U.S.
Policy , ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1978)
.
10
an appropriate way to measure economic well-being, otherwise an
increase in the death rate of the poor in a country would have
to be regarded as economic improvement.
Roy Prosterman observed the relationship between infant
mortality and death of young children and family size, and argued
that with a high death rate of children, parents must have large
families to ensure that some children will survive to be able to
help support the family and the parents in illness and old age.
Mary Alice Caiendo, based on the results of a computer simulation
study, indicates that with current infant and adult mortality
rate in India, "a couple must have 6.3 children to ensure a 95
percent chance of one son living until the father's sixty-fifth
birthday." 16
16
. M. A. Caiendo, Nutrition and the World Food Crisis
(New York: Macmillan, 1979)
.
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CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S POPULATION PROBLEM
In this chapter, a short historical background of China is
presented reviewing population growth in China since 2100 B.C..
China's population growth was fairly slow and smooth for a long
time until the 1800s when it entered the rapid growth period and
showed an exponential growth property. Then a brief review of
the major events that occurred after 1949 when the communist
party established the new government and the underlying policies
which caused the events are presented. These events and policies
determined the direction of Chinese population growth trend.
Inconsistent population policy and inappropriate economic policy
were mainly responsible for the current population problem.
Next, the origin of the current one-child-per-family policy will
be described to formulate the problem of this study. Although
the policy originally promoted voluntary family planning, it
later turned out to be coercive and has caused a worldwide
debate
.
1. POPULATION GROWTH BEFORE 194917
Although demographic data goes back over 4,000 years, the
validity of the figures for China's early population is open to
question. However, the dubious validity of the specific figures
17
. Data in this section are from Fan Wenlan, The General
History of China , (in Chinese)
.
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does not prevent us from getting a picture of the historical
trends. Chinese population growth over the past 4,000 years can
be divided into three stages. The first was from the Xia to the
beginning of the Qin Dynasty (2100 B.C.—221 B.C.). The second
was from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty (221 B.C.—1650 A.D.). The
third stage is from Qing to the present.
The first stage to 221 B.C. was a long period of slow growth
during which the population remained small and somewhat stable.
The first farming communities grew up along the lower Yellow
River and their agriculture was based on wheat, not rice. By
3000 BC we can think in terms of a million peasants in the area
on either side of the lower Yellow River. Together with another
million food-gatherers elsewhere in China, this gives a total
figure of China's population then of 2 million. With the
collapse of the Shang Dynasty around 1000 BC, civilized China
split up into a dozen warring states, but the rate of population
growth increased. This was partly because an irrigation system
was being developed in the Yellow River basin, and partly because
the Yangtze River valley was then being brought under cultivati-
on. By 400 BC there were about 25 million. The population may
have stabilized around 20 million during the 2,000 years period
before the country was first unified under the Qin Dynasty in 221
B.C.. From figure 1, we can see that the population reached its
first maximum at about that time.
The breakthrough to new demographic ground came during the
13
Song Dynasty18 around 1000 AD. The basis for the new advances
was fuller exploitation of the rice-growing potential of the
Yangtze valley, and the consequent southward shift in the
country's political center of gravity. Mongol Khans ruled China
for a little more than a century since 1211, when there was one
of the bitterest and most prolonged wars of conquest in world
history. The loss of the country's population in Yuan Dynasty19
was estimated at 35 million. Demographic recovery started from
the Ming Dynasty20 in the late 13th century and on the eve of the
Ming Dynasty there was around 150 million population. The Manchu
conquest costs China about 25 million people. By 1700 this loss
was made up and in the political calm of the 18th century there
came a population surge that carried the total past 300 million.
The rate of growth—100 percent in 100 years—was too high to be
good. The Malthusian specter of overpopulation had arrived. By
1949, China's population growth had for years been about 25
percent, while the world population during the same period rose
by more than 100 percent21 . But until that time, even small
percentage rises could result in colossal absolute gains when the
existing population was measured in hundreds of millions. This
can be easily seen from the following population growth curve.
Song Dynasty ( 960 -- 1279 A.D. ).
19
20
21
History
Yuan Dynasty ( 1271 — 1368 A.D. ).
Ming Dynasty ( 1368 — 1644 A.D. ).
C. McEvedy and R. Jones, Atlas of World Population
Britain, 1978.
14
400BC
#1. POPULATION GROWTH TREND
(400 B.C.--1983 A.D.
400AD IK 1500
YEARS
1700 18G5
15
From Figure 1, we can see that the population growth trend began
to exhibit the shape of strict exponential property.
In feudalist China, from 221 B.C. to 1911 A.D., 50 to 60
million seems to have been the ceiling of China's population in
most of the times. Increases to this level must have been
related to the economic prosperity of feudal civilization.
During the 1,650 years after the first peak size was reached, the
population went up and down drastically, and these fluctuations
occurred in quite regular cycles approximately equal to the
average length of a dynasty. In other words, these variations
appear to have been associated with the rise and fall of
dynasties. The population usually began to grow with the
establishment of a new dynasty, reach its ceiling, and then, as
the dynasty started to fall, would decline until a new dynasty
was set up. Then the population would grow again. The creation
of a dynasty brought political stability and economic prosperity.
Whatever their political, economic, and social causes, the
population cycles took place through the fluctuation of
mortality.
2. POPULATION GROWTH SINCE 1949
China has almost completed its population transition from
high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low
fertility between 1949 to 1984. The establishment of the
People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the end of over a
century of national and civil wars in Chinese territory and
16
brought the country to peace, as well as a period of
unprecedented population growth. Restoration of peace, and the
extension of health and medical services drastically reduced
death rates while birth rates remained high. Starting from a
population estimated at some 540 million in 1949, the annual rate
of growth was above 2 percent a year from 1949 through 1957,
largely due to the rapidly falling death rate. Over 104 million
people were added in these eight years. This was the first of
the two population booms since 1949, with the second coming
between 1963 and the early 1970s.
The 1953 census reported a total population of 583 million,
and the 1964 census a total of 695 million. The total gain
within this interval was 112 million, or an average annual growth
of about 2.3 percent. This gain would have been higher had it
not been interrupted by the sharp drop in birth rate and rise in
death rate after the Great Leap Forward when China was facing
famine, resulting from Mao Zedong's crash program to decentralize
industry and to collectivize agriculture. The radical economic
policies of the Great Leap Forward caused a temporary reversal of
the sharp declining trend of mortality. Right after the Great
Leap Forward, the total population decreased in 1960 and 1961 for
the first time since 1949, and went back to the 1959 level in
1962. Rural population decrease was the major share. The death
rate reached the ever high record and the natural growth rate for
the first time appeared to be negative. 22 Note that the infant
22
. See figure 2, constructed with the data from table 2.
17
death rate increased drastically after 1958 after a smooth
decrease period since 1949. 23 As infants are more sensitive to
any change of environment and living condition, such a sharp
increase of infant death rate is the main reason for the sharp
increase of the aggregate death rate. Also note that after
another smooth decrease, the infant death rate started to
increase in 1979, which was the year when the government began to
introduce the one-child-per-family policy. Like the case from
1958 to 1961, this increase, accompanied by the continuous
improvement of medical care and social service system, can only
be the result of unusual external disturbance.
Soon after the crisis, a more liberal economic policy was
launched, and population growth returned to its normal trend,
averaging over 2.6 percent a year from 1964 to 1970—the highest
level since 1949. The recovery in 1962 reached a level similar
to the total fertility rate in 1950s, and peaked at 7.5 in 1963.
The total fertility rate in the mid- to late 1960s remained close
to level of the mid-1950s except for a temporary decline in 1967
coinciding with one year after the start of the Cultural
Revolution. The 130 million net gain marked the second
population boom.
The total population increased in the 1970s and reached
970.9 million by the decade's end. While the natural growth rate
since early 1980s has been lower than any time since 1949 as the
direct result of the new one-child-per-family policy, the
23
. See figure 3, constructed with the data in table 2.
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increase in absolute numbers has been increasing substantially
because of the huge population base and the age structure of the
population.
The present condition in China's population can be summed up
in the following features:
(1) The population base is huge. By the end of 1980, the
total population exceeded 1,000 million.
(2) Despite the sharp fall in the rate of population
growth, the rate is still above 10 per thousand. Because of the
large absolute size, the net absolute increase per year remains
anywhere between 11 and 12 million, basically the same as in the
1950s.
(3) The population displays a young age structure.
According to the 10 percent sample of the third census, children
of 14 and under make up a large proportion - 33.6 percent. The
young age structure means that a huge number of people will soon
enter marriage and child-bearing age, which will exert a
tremendous influence on the rate of population growth in the
future
.
(4) Since 1949, there were two boom periods of population
growth, each lasting several years. The first boom began in 1950
and continued through 1957. The annual birth rate in this period
was above 30 per thousand, and the yearly births topped 2
million. Most of the people born then have now married and
produced their own children. The second boom lasted from 1962 to
1971, with the annual birth rate again above 30 per thousand.
19
Each of the ten years saw the birth of more than 25 million
people, with the exception of 24.6 million in 1962. The highest
number was 29.54 million in 1963.
(5) The rural proportion of the population is large. In
1983, the rural population made up 76.5 percent of the nation's
total. Although this number is lower than the 89.4 percent in
1949, the absolute number has risen sharply—from 484 million in
1949 to 784 million in 1983. The birth rate in the rural areas
is 30 percent higher than in the cities. The big size and the
high birth rate of the rural population will have a direct
bearing on the future trend of population growth. Table 2 shows
the close correlation of the net national population growth trend
and the net rural population growth trend.
Table 3 is the result of 1982 census. Figure 4 is
constructed from this table. The figure indicates that after the
start of a peaceful and relatively stable society in China,
mortality came down and fertility rate went up substantially.
The peak in figure 4 represents the baby boom, following the
economic adjustment after the Great Leap Forward and great
depression. Figure 4 shows a significant change of age
structure, represented by a large number of young people in age
group 5-19. This huge young population will affect China's
population for years, thus a radical population policy will speed
up the process of aging population, which will be discussed
later.
20
Table 1. TOTAL POPULATION
(End of the year)
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL POPU. MALE FEMALE URBAN RURAL
1949 541.67 281.45 260.22 57.65 484.02
1950 551.96 286.69 265.27 61.69 490.27
1951 563.00 292.31 270.69 66.32 496.68
1952 574.82 298.33 276.49 71.63 503.19
1953 587.96 304.68 288.38 78.26 509.70
1954 602.66 312.42 290.24 82.49 520.17
1955 614.65 318.09 296.56 82.85 531.80
1956 628.28 325.36 302.92 91.85 536.43
1957 646.53 334.68 311.84 99.49 547.04
1958 659.94 341.95 317.99 107.21 552.73
1959 672.07 348.90 323.17 123.71 548.36
1960 662.07 342.83 319.24 130.73 531.34
1961 658.58 338.80 319.79 127.07 531.52
1962 672.95 345.17 327.78 116.59 556.36
1963 691.72 355.33 336.39 116.46 575.26
1964 704.99 361.42 343.57 129.50 575.49
1965 725.38 371.28 354.10 130.45 594.93
1966 745.42 381.89 363.53 133.13 612.29
1967 763.68 391.15 372.53 135.48 628.20
1968 785.34 402.26 383.08 138.38 646.96
1969 806.71 412.89 393.82 141.17 665.54
1970 829.96 426.86 403.06 144.24 685.68
1971 852.29 438.18 414.10 147.11 705.18
1972 871.77 448.13 423.64 149.35 722.42
1973 892.11 458.76 433.35 153.45 738.66
1974 908.59 467.27 441.32 155.95 752.64
1975 924.20 475.64 448.56 160.30 763.90
1976 937.17 482.57 454.60 163.41 773.76
1977 949.74 489.08 460.66 166.69 783.05
1978 962.59 495.67 466.92 172.45 790.14
1979 975.42 501.92 473.50 184.95 790.47
1980 987.05 507.85 479.20 191.40 795.65
1981 1,000.72 515.19 485.53 201.71 799.01
1982 1,015.41 523.10 492.31 211.54 803.87
1983 1,024.95 528.65 496.30 241.26 783.69
Source
:
China Statistical Year Book. 1984, The State
Statistical Bureau, p. 81, (in Chinese)
.
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Table 2. BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL GROWTH RATES
(Rate per 1,000)
YEAR BIRTH RATE DEATH RATE NATURAL GROWTH RATE
Total Infant Nation Urban Rural
1949 36.00 20.00 - 16.00
1950 37.00 18.00 - 19.00
1951 37.80 17.80 - 20.00
1952 37.00 17.00 - 20.00
1953 37.00 14.00 175 23.00
1954 37.97 13.18 164 24.79
1955 32.60 12.28 154 20.32
1956 31.90 11.40 143 20.50
1957 34.03 10.80 132 23.23
1958 29.22 11.98 146 17.24
1959 24.78 14.59 160 10.19
1960 20.86 25.43 284 -4.57
1961 18.02 14.24 183 3.78
1962 37.01 10.02 89 26.99
1963 43.37 10.04 87 33.33
1964 39.14 11.50 86 27.64
1965 37.88 9.50 84 28.38
1966 35.05 8.83 83 26.22
1967 33.96 8.43 82 25.53
1968 35.59 8.21 81 27.38
1969 34.11 8.03 76 26.08
1970 33.43 7.60 70 25.83
1971 30.65 7.73 65 23.33
1972 29.77 7.61 60 22.16
1973 27.93 7.04 56 20.89
1974 24.82 7.34 52 17.48
1975 23.01 7.32 49 15.69
1976 19.91 7.25 45 12.66
1977 18.93 6.87 41 12.06
1978 18.25 6.25 37 12.00
1979 17.82 6.21 39 11.61
1980 18.21 6.34 42 11.87
1981 20.91 6.36 44 14.55
1982 21.09 6.60 46 14.49
1983 18.62 7.08 48 11.54
1984 - - 50 -
34.38
31.37
30.44
36.01
24.33
18.51
14.26
10.24
27.18
37.37
24.90
20.90
15.26
15.95
14.01
12.39
9.26
9.32
6.52
7.87
8.44
8.60
8.69
11.31
12.96
10.07
23.80
19.14
19.40
21.74
15.91
9.17
-9.23
2.41
26.95
32.70
28.10
29.47
27.24
24.29
23.26
22.03
18.60
16.58
13.50
12.64
12.49
12.04
12.35
15.02
14.97
12.20
Source: China Statistical Year Book, 1984 . The State
Statistical Bureau, p. 81, (in Chinese)
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Table 3. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AGE GROUPS
10 % SAMPLE OF THE THIRD CENSUS
(Third Census, July 1, 1982)
(Million)
AGE GROUP TOTAL POPU.
(person)
0/() IN TOTAL POPU. SEX RATIO
total male female (female=100)
TOTAL 100.38 100.00 51.33 48.67 105.46
0-4 9.47 9.44 4.88 4.56 107.15
5-9 11.07 11.03 5.68 5.35 106.24
10-14 13.18 13.13 6.76 6.37 106.13
15-19 12.53 12.48 6.35 6.13 103.55
20-24 7.43 7.40 3.77 3.63 103.84
25-29 9.26 9.22 4.76 4.46 106.63
30-34 7.30 7.27 3.78 3.49 108.15
35-39 5.42 5.40 2.84 2.56 111.26
40-44 4.84 4.82 2.57 2.25 114.18
45-49 4.74 4.72 2.50 2.22 112.23
50-54 4.09 4.07 2.15 1.92 111.77
55-59 3.39 3.38 1.74 1.63 106.64
60-64 2.74 2.73 1.37 1.36 100.34
65-69 2.13 2.12 1.01 1.11 91.73
70-74 1.43 1.43 0.64 0.79 81.40
75-79 0.86 0.86 0.35 0.51 68.43
80-84 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.23 57.26
85-89 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.07 46.18
90-94 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 37.16
95-99 • • • * • • • • • 41.60
above 100 • • • • • • • • • 39.11
Source: China Statistical Year Book. 1984 , The State
Statistical Bureau, p. 97 (in Chinese)
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Note from figure 4 the big shortfall in the 20-24 age group.
Such a significant shortfall can only be the result of war or
other severe disasters. In reality, this is the result of the
high mortality during depression and famine caused by the radical
economic policy during the Great Leap Forward. Everything else
looks normal. Some western scientists believe that China lost
over 30 million population in that period. From the big
shortfall, we find that estimation reasonable. Without that
external policy disturbance, we should expect a smooth population
curve. From this result, we should have an idea on the effect of
that disaster. As mentioned before, unstable population is
caused by external disturbances. In the Chinese case, most of
the ups and downs of population are the result of internal policy
disturbances
.
The 1982 census revealed that Chinese population is
characterized by relatively small cohorts in the age group 0-4
years because of the reduced number of children born in the low
fertility period since late 1970s, when the new population policy
was implemented. We can see from the preceeding figure that
there is a large bulge in the age group 5-19 years; about 36.79
million young people were born during the high fertility period
from mid-1962 to 1978. We have sufficient reason to conclude
that this large group of young people is the result of the Great
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, or wrong political and
economic policies. During the ten years of Cultural Revolution,
the social and economic systems and life were out of order,
27
people had nothing meaningful to do, and family planning system
was also destroyed. Many people viewed that period as the
"golden time" to have children, and bearing children was the only
meaningful thing to do. We can conclude that unstable and
inconsistent policies are responsible for the unstable
population. Without such external disturbances, we might expect
a smaller population size and a more normal population age
structure
.
3. THE ORIGINS OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
Since 1949, the science of demography has been viewed with
suspicion and hostility by most of China's party and government
leaders. This is an unfortunate legacy of the writings of Karl
Marx a century ago attacking Thomas Malthus' views of the
relationship between population growth and food supply. Social
scientists who warned of the potential economic problems of
continued rapid population growth were denounced as
"Malthusianists" and were severely criticized. Chief among them
was the famous economist Ma Yinchu, who was removed from his
position as the president of Beijing University and not
rehabilitated until 1978. The chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party Mao Zedong believed that revolution plus production would
solve the problem of feeding and employing China's people. Mao's
opinion in population can be viewed as "supply-side" perspective
on population size and growth. This view sees each person as
supplying a pair of hands—hands that when better organized
28
through revolution—can enhance production. The larger the
population, the greater the supply of hands, and thus the greater
the total production. Maybe this is due to Marx's theory that
only labor can create value, although without some other factors
of production, people simply cannot be productive. And instead
of coming only with hands, each person comes also with a mouth,
needing to be fed immediately. Demand for goods and services
shoots up as mouths-births-multiply, straining resources. With
the cohorts of the baby boom of the 1960s about to enter the
marrying and childbearing ages, some 10 million couples every
year, a second baby boom will inevitably push up natural growth
rate and absolute numbers, even if all couples merely reproduce
themselves with an average of two children per couple. This is
the background of the one-child-per-family policy.
Deputy Qian Xinzhong, minister of public health, said in 1979:
"At the existing rate of population growth, China will have a
population of 1,300 million by the end of the century. .. .We plan
to slow the country's natural rate of population growth to around
5 per 1,000 by 1985.... This means that on the average each couple
as of now can have only one child."24 Since 1979, the government
position has changed from simple encouragement of the one-child
family to insistence that almost all couples stop at one healthy
living child, in order to achieve the ambitious targets of 0.5
percent growth in 1985 and zero growth rate in the year 2000.
24
. Qian, Xinzhong, "Discussion on Family Planning", Beii ing
Review , vol. 22, no. 28, 1979.
29
4. CONCLUSION
From the historical review of the Chinese population, we can
find out that social transformations were the main factors that
caused the population to experience substantial ups and downs.
After each of these transformations, population would increase a
great deal because of the following peace and relatively stable
society. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that in order to
reach and to keep a stationary population, a stable and peaceful
social and economic condition is crucial. The main reasons for
the current population pressure in China is the wrong population
theory and economic policy.
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CHAPTER POUR
EVALUATION OF CHINA'S CONTEMPORARY POPULATION POLICY
1. RESISTANCE TO THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
Although the practical necessity of limiting population
growth has become increasingly accepted in China, the one-child
policy has certainly not gone without opposition. This is not
surprising because a nation of one-child families naturally means
that about half the couples will have no sons, a fact that is
bound to lead to difficulties, given the traditional Chinese
values and practical importance of male offspring within Chinese
society. Opposition to current population policy is great, and
reports of female infanticide, abuse of women who give birth to
daughters, and other manifestations of this continuing preference
for sons show clearly that such opposition is often translated
into active forms of resistance.
This resistance is highly important because of the human
misery involved. When the government adopted the one-child-per-
family policy in 1979, it claimed that the purpose was to
encourage and protect voluntary decision by couples on family
planning, and to compensate the one-child family. But in reality
the policy relies on coercion, economic penalties, and forced
abortion for refusal to comply, and imposes penalties on families
with two children, regardless of the fact that two children are
allowed according to the Marriage Law. As a direct result of
this policy/ more than 54 million unborn children are estimated
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to have been killed in China. 25 The incidence of female
infanticide in China has also increased drastically to several
hundred thousand deaths per year.
The policy also makes use of a "birth quota" system that
gives family planning officials the power to dictate to couples
if and when they may have even the one child permitted under the
new policy. Since all citizens are subject to strict monitoring
by State officials through the rationing of "birth coupons",
those officials often invade individual privacy, violate a
woman's right to privacy by monitoring private details of her
life (including releasing the woman's menstruation information in
order to track compliance with the policy) , intimidate couples
verbally and threaten them with force to pressure compliance.
According to State guideline, each province sets its own
guidelines for the desired number of children to be born during
the year. These guidelines are often translated into rigid
quotas at the unit level, such as factories, communes, and
universities. Couples must apply for permission from their unit
to have a child; some have to wait until quotas are available.
Many couples becoming pregnant without quota or permission are
25
. U.S. Government Document, 99th Congress, 1st Session,
H. CON. RES. 102, Concerning United States Policy Toward the
One-Child-Per-Family Program and Forced Abortion Policies of the
People's Republic of China. Also refer to S. RES. 275 and H.
RES. 212.
Some unpublished information and predictions I received
from medical agencies in China, though not to be adopted as
reference, indicate that the real number is higher than figures
in the above reports. This at least convinces me that the figure
provided by the above documents is reasonable.
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forced to have abortions, even in the ninth month of the
pregnancy. An official of the State Family Planning Commission
said "The principle of population control and family planning in
China is people's voluntary decision in accordance with state
guideline." For women who are pregnant without quota or
permission, "We will try to persuade them to terminate
pregnancy." For those who refuse to accept the persuasion, "We
will take some actions, such as put economic penalties."26 Many
workers and farmers leave their jobs and hide in order to save
the unborn children. In these cases, the government and
officials reduce the family's basic means of living such as
salaries, wages, rations, housing and garden allotments, 27 and
apply various other discriminations and penalties, such as in
work assignment, promotion, and even welfare for their children.
For example, families with more than one child will have trouble
sending their children to school, and the children will face
discrimination of various types simply because they are not the
only child in their family.
The use of contraceptive pill and devices is mandatory.
Women are compelled to forced IUD ( intra-uterine device)
implementation even right after their delivery. For those with
more than two children, at least one individual of the couple
22. The above talk was made by a top official of the State
Family Planning Commission when he was answering questions during
a visit by a British journalist in late 1986. People's Daily ,
(Overseas Edition), November 22, 1986, (in Chinese).
27
. In cities, employees are given housing through their
working units at low rents. Private housing is not common.
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might be forced to receive sterilization. With the social,
cultural, economic and family pressure, many couples are driven
to practice infanticide of female babies in order to assure that
their only child is male.
The recent reappearance of female infanticide in China is a
complex phenomenon, one that must be understood on its own terms,
as the result of specific cultural, historical, and above all,
economic factors. If these factors are not taken into account,
it can all be easily misunderstood. Traditionally, female
infanticide was the last resort of farmer families threatened by
starvation. When parents were driven to kill their own children,
it was a sign of how severe their situation was. Female
infanticide happened in Chinese history when severe famine
occurred. If parents want and can afford to have children, but
for some reason they have to kill their children, it is obviously
a human misery. Nowadays Parents take the risk and kill their
female baby because they want to have a son. Even though the
Chinese government denies the fact that female infanticide exits
in China, it can be observed almost anywhere in the country since
the one-child policy was put into practice, not only in poor
rural area, but also in prosperous cities. Even though some
parents have been put into jail for killing their babies, others
are still doing it. Some kind of therapies become quite popular
because people believe that these therapies can determine the sex
of the unborn child. Result of sex test during early pregnancy
are not reported if the baby is female, since knowing that they
34
are going to have a girl, those parents may choose to have what
the government calls "voluntary" abortion.
2. CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF ANTI-FEMALE BIAS
The fact that daughters were killed first when the parents
had difficulty was a reflection of the anti-female bias embedded
in traditional Chinese culture, Confucius, Mencius and folk
alike, and the fact that sons had much greater potential for
benefiting the family economically. At present, we should expose
and criticize such reactionary notions as "males are exalted,
females are demeaned" and "the more sons the more blessings"
.
"Males are exalted, females are demeaned" is an important
dimension of the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius. As expressed
in marriage, it meant that man took a wife, that the wife obeyed
the husband, and the wife was a maid to the husband and to the
household as well as being a breeding machine. As reflected in
childbearing, it meant that boys were valued more than girls.
The notion that "the more sons the more blessings" is the
result not only of cultural but also economic factors. Given
that the Chinese kinship system is both patrilineal and
patrilocal, only sons were full and permanent members of, and
contributors of labor power to, their parents' family. To have
at least one son was therefore seen as one of life's most basic
necessities. Only a son could guarantee that the family name
would survive and that the parents would be taken care of in
their old age. Traditionally, sons fulfilled vital symbolic and
35
economic functions, whereas daughters were seen as merely
temporary members of the family. Contemporary female infanticide
is, like that of earlier times, the result of a combination of
ideological and material factors. Some people are no doubt still
influenced by traditional ideas concerning ancestor worship and
keeping the family line alive. On the other hand, in the absence
of a developed social welfare system, the only way parents can
feel secure about their old age is to have a son to take care of
them later on. Living out one's life in one's family is the
Chinese tradition and this enables the old to enjoy domesticity
as well as being taken care of by their family members. "This
should be the main way for the old to spend their remaining
years, complemented by society-run old folks' homes and
apartments." 28 Female infanticide is thus the last resort of
those hoping to ensure their survival. It is easy to criticize
the feudalist philosophy and to blame those parents or
grandparents who strongly prefer boys to girls, but not much can
really be done to reverse this attitude before the level of
education, or more directly, the level of economic development,
is increased.
28
. By Yao Shuben, director of the Policy Research
Institute at the National Committee for Old People, and Wang
Ruoyu, vice-director of the institute. China Daily , Vol. 5, No.
1507, May 24, 1986.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POPUIATION PROJECTIONS
To fully understand Chinese population policy and its
impacts on economic development and social welfare requires
careful studies of Chinese population structure and future
trends. Population projections are the ideal approach to analyze
population policy implications, since demographic dimensions are
essential to most policy concerns. In this chapter, I will
discuss some population models and analyze the impacts of current
Chinese population policy on economic development and social
welfare. First I introduce the population growth function and
the population projections based on different assumptions. The
crucial determinant in the population growth function is the
number of children per woman in fertility age, or the average
total fertility rate (TFR) . This variable will affect not only
population size, but also affect population structure. Under the
assumption of one-child-per-family, which is the current
population policy, China will face a high dependency ratio in the
near future, and this will hinder China's Four Modernization
Plan. 29 Secondly, sex ratio is discussed. With Chinese people's
strong preference for son and the government's strict restriction
for each couple to have only one child, female infanticide has
reappeared. If this policy continues, it will cause frustration
29
. Modernization in industry, agriculture, science and
technology and defence.
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and human misery, and create social, psychological and
demographic problems. Thirdly, population age composition is
discussed. According to the population projection, Chinese
population will age significantly during the coming decades. The
more rapidly the fertility declines, the earlier the population
ages. The projection indicates that the more serious
conseguences of aging population will not come until about early
next century, therefore current Chinese government tends to
concentrate on the immediate problems of population size and
defer consideration of the problems resulted from population
aging. Finally, we project output growth and output per capita
under different population policy assumptions.
1. POPULATION GROWTH FUNCTION
The population growth function can be defined as:
f 50
B(a, t) = N(t) I s(a, t) * h(a, t) * p(a, t)da, 30 (1)
J 18
where a is age, t is time, s(a, t) is the female ratio function,
representing the percentage of female from the total population
within a given age interval a at year t, p(a, t) is the
population density function, representing the percentage of
population of certain age interval from the total population,
h(a, t) is the ratio of a certain time interval to a woman's
30
. Mathematical derivation of this model is prepared in
appendix 2 of chapter five.
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entire fertility age, B(a, t) is the number of new borne children
in year t, and N(t) is the number of children each woman produces
in her fertility age period.
With this model, we can express the effects of China's
population policy quantitatively. For example, "To encourage
late marriage and late childbearing" will have the impact of
increasing the value of lower limit a^, which will reduce the
fertility interval; If all women get married at 20, a^ will
increase from 18 to 20. If all women have their first child at
age 25, then the fertility interval will be [25, 50] instead of
[18, 50]. "To encourage late birth" will postpone the peak value
of h in the model; and "To encourage fewer children" will reduce
the average fertility ratio N, and so on.
The major concern in this paper is to examine the policy
implications of different level of N. The current Chinese
population policy is equivalent to N = 1. A simulation done by a
group of Chinese scientists in demography, computer science and
control theory revealed some interesting inferences. According
to the projection, 31 there are several possible outcomes in the
next 100 years, based on different population policy assumptions,
ranging from no government intervention to the strict
implementation of the one-child-per-family restriction which is
31
. The result of the projection was briefly introduced by
the head of the project, Song Jian, in 1982. Population
Projection and Population Control . (Song Jian, Tian Xueyuan,
Beijing: 1982, in Chinese)
.
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the current policy. 32 The most important determinant is the
average total fertility rate, the N in the model discussed above.
Five projections have been made, for N = 3, 2.3, 2, 1.5 and 1.
The different projections of population are summarized below,
starting with N=3.
32
. This is not assumed by the scientists of the original
projection.
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(1) Population projection with N = 3.0. With N = 3.0,
which is the actual fertility rate in 1975, the total population
will be 1.42 billion in 2000, 1.915 billion in 2020, 2.949
billion in 2050 and 4.308 billion in 2080. That is, China's
total population then will approximately be equal to the
aggregate world population today. 33 Under this situation, the
growth trend exhibits exponential growth property and will
increase in an increasing speed. 34
Table 4. POPULATION PROJECTION WITH N = 3.0
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL POPU. MALE FEMALE OLD POPU.
(Above 65)
YOUNG POPU.
(0-14)
1980 986 506 480 50 332
1985 1,037 550 523 58 322
1990 1,180 605 575 68 347
1995 1,303 668 635 79 419
2000 1,420 728 692 94 460
2005 1,526 783 743 108 469
2010 1,636 839 797 123 465
2015 1,765 905 860 150 484
2020 1,915 982 933 191 537
2025 2,075 1,064 1,011 221 594
2030 2,233 1,145 1,088 281 631
2035 2,393 1,227 1,166 348 649
2040 2,562 1,314 1,248 400 672
2045 2,745 1,408 1,337 417 717
2050 2,949 1,512 1,437 459 800
2055 3,147 1,614 1,533 507 839
2060 3,338 1,712 1,626 556 883
2065 3,542 1,816 1,726 602 922
2070 3,794 1,946 1,848 664 972
2075 4,051 2,077 1,974 712 1,041
2080 4,308 2,209 2,099 755 1,117
33
. See table 4. The projection was done in 1980. N=3.0
was the average fertility rate in 1975. The table assumed that
N=3 . is kept throughout
.
34
. See figure 5, constructed with the data in table 4.
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(2) Population projection with N = 2.3. With N = 2.3, which
was the fertility level in 1978, the total population will be
1.286 billion in 2000, 1.544 in 2020, 1.913 billion in 2050 and
2.132 billion in 2080. 35 Under this assumption, the population
growth will increase in a decreasing rate. However, by 2080,
China will have over 2 billion population, and this giant size is
still too big to be good, since it exceeds the capacity of
Chinese resources to support such a huge population.
Table 5. POPULATION PROJECTION WITH N = 2.3
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL POPU. MALE FEMALE OLD POPU.
(Above 65)
YOUNG POPU.
(0-14)
1980 982 504 478 50 328
1985 1,044 535 509 58 293
1990 1,119 574 545 68 285
1995 1,204 617 587 79 324
2000 1,286 659 627 94 354
2005 1,353 694 659 108 356
2010 1,411 724 687 123 337
2015 1,473 755 718 150 325
2020 1,544 792 752 191 335
2025 1,618 830 788 221 357
2030 1,687 865 822 281 370
2035 1,749 897 852 348 368
2040 1,805 926 879 400 360
2045 1,856 952 904 414 360
2050 1,913 981 932 433 372
2055 1,955 1,r 002 953 452 385
2060 1,978 1,,014 964 468 391
2065 1,999 1,,025 974 482 390
2070 2,047 1,,050 997 510 390
2075 2,095 1,r 074 1,021 528 395
2080 2,132 1,,093 1,039 537 405
35
. See table 5. N=2.3 is the average fertility ratio in
1978. Table 5 assumes that N=2.3 is kept throughout.
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(3) Population projection with N = 2.0, that is, each couple
has two children; the total population will keep increasing for
72 years. Total population will be 1.222 billion in 2000, 1.388
billion in 2020, 1.542 billion in 2050 and will reach the maximum
of 1.55 billion in 2052, as can be seen from figure 7. Then it
will begin to decrease in 2053 and in 2080, total population will
be 1.483. 36 If everything else remains stable, the population
will decline smoothly thereafter and eventually reach the stage
of stationary population, though this is a fairly long period.
Table 6. POPULATION PROJECTION WITH N = 2.
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL POPU. MALE FEMALE OLD POPU . YOUNG POPU.
(Ab(Dve 65) (0-14)
1980 978 502 476 50 325
1985 1,028 527 501 58 277
1990 1,088 558 530 68 255
1995 1,157 593 564 79 280
2000 1,222 627 595 94 306
2005 1,272 652 620 108 305
2010 1,310 672 638 123 281
2015 1,346 690 656 150 260
2020 1,388 712 676 191 258
2025 1,431 734 697 221 269
2030 1,469 753 716 281 275
2035 1,498 768 730 348 269
2040 1,518 778 740 400 255
2045 1,529 784 745 410 247
2050 1,542 791 751 419 247
2055 1,540 790 750 425 250
2060 1,517 778 739 427 249
2065 1,491 765 726 426 243
2070 1,488 763 725 439 236
2075 1,492 765 727 448 232
2080 1,483 760 723 446 231
36
. See table 6. The result in the table assumes that
N=2.3 in 1978 decreased for two years and became N=2.0 in 1980.
This level is kept throughout.
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Table 7. POPULATION PROJECTION WITH N = 1.5
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL POPU. MALE FEMALE OLD POPU.
(Above 65)
YOUNG POPU.
(0-14)
1980 978 502 476 50 325
1985 1,012 519 493 58 261
1990 1,048 537 511 68 215
1995 1,091 559 532 79 214
2000 1,130 579 551 94 229
2005 1,155 592 563 108 227
2010 1,167 598 569 123 203
2015 1,171 600 571 150 175
2020 1,175 603 572 191 159
2025 1,178 604 574 221 156
2030 1,177 604 573 281 155
2035 1,169 599 570 348 147
2040 1,150 590 560 400 133
2045 1,119 574 545 410 120
2050 1,087 557 530 405 113
2055 1,039 533 506 390 108
2060 972 498 474 367 104
2065 901 462 439 343 097
2070 853 437 416 334 090
2075 819 420 399 329 083
2080 781 401 380 316 078
(4) Population projection with N = 1.5. With N = 1.5, that
is, half of the families have one child and half have two
children, and the nation's population will still be increasing
for 47 years. Total population will be 1.13 billion in 2000,
1.175 billion in 2020 and reaches the maximum value of 1.178
billion in 2027. 37 It will begin to decrease in 2028 and the
total population in 2050 will be 1.087 billion. In 2080, the
total population will decrease to 0.781 billion, approximately
equivalent to the level
37
. See figure 8, constructed with the data in table 7.
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in 1968. 38 This assumption will lead to the most ideal target
population, estimated by scientists based on China's resources,
including space, in about a century.
If we further assume that everything else remains stable and
that the government can successfully adjust its population policy
step by step, China's can reach the target of stationary
population.
(5) Population projection with N=1.0. If the average
fertility rate has a substantial drop after 1980 and is kept at
N=1.0, which means that every couple is allowed to have only one
child for a century, the total population will still increase for
25 years and will reach its maximum level of 1.053 billion in
2004. 39 Total population will begin to decrease in 2005 and will
reach 1.003 billion in 2020, 0.771 billion in 2050, and 0.37
billion in 2080. 40
From table 8, we can see that, based on pure computation,
the dependency ratio will be over 50 percent after the year of
2040, and in 2080 only 40 percent of the total population is of
working age. It is obviously another extreme of policy effect,
38
. See table 7. N=1.5 means that N decreases from N=2.3 in
1978 smoothly to N=1.5 in 1980 and then is kept throughout.
39
. See figure 9, constructed with the data in table 8.
40
. See table 8. Recently, the government allows some
couples with special reasons and some of those in rural areas to
have second child. This in some extent indicates that the
radical one-child approach is not practical. The result of the
projection with N=1.0 shows that this approach is very
unrealistic and very difficult to achieve.
49
compared to the first scenario with N = 3, as we discussed
earlier. As we continue our study, we will find out that this
option is harmful to Chinese economy.
Table 8. POPULATION PROJECTION WITH N = 1.0
(Million)
YEAR TOTAL MALE FEMALE OLD YOUNG Old Ratio41
(Above 65) (0-14)
1980 978 502 476 50 325 0.05
1985 1 ,008 517 491 58 257 0.06
1990 1 ,021 524 497 68 188 0.07
1995 1 ,037 532 505 79 160 0.08
2000 1
r
050 538 512 94 153 0.09
2005 1 ,053 540 513 108 151 0.10
2010 1 ,044 535 509 123 133 0.12
2015 1
r
025 526 499 150 108 0.15
2020 1
r
003 514 489 191 88 0.19
2025 978 502 476 221 76 0.23
2030 951 488 463 281 71 0.30
2035 919 471 448 348 65 0.38
2040 878 450 428 400 56 0.46
2045 825 423 402 410 47 0.50
2050 771 395 376 402 40 0.52
2055 701 359 342 366 35 0.52
2060 613 314 299 319 32 0.52
2065 523 268 255 271 28 0.52
2070 457 234 223 241 24 0.53
2075 407 209 198 219 21 0.54
2080 370 190 180 203 18 0.55
Note the last column, the old ratio. In 1980, the old ratio
was 0.05, which means that only 5 percent of the total population
was aged people. However, by 2045, 50 percent of the total
population will be aged people, and in 2080, if we assume the
policy is still in place, the old dependents will comprise 55
41
. The old ratio at year t is computed with the
following formula:
Old Ratio (t) = 0(t) / P(t)
where 0(t) is the number of old dependents, and P(t) the
total population at year t, respectively.
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percent of the total population. Such an aging population will
put a heavy burden on the working people.
The above projections are mathematical computations, but they
can be used for reference when thinking about population policy
and program. From these mathematical projections, we can find
that the population growth trend is strongly influenced by the
government's policy. 42 If each couple has more than two
children, the total population will have a substantial increase.
But under the current one-child-per-family policy, with the
current population structure and base, the Chinese population
will decrease substantially. Our discussion also demonstrates
the well-known phenomenon of demographic momentum, which is the
tendency for population growth to continue beyond the time that
replacement fertility has been achieved. This is because of a
relatively high concentration of population in the childbearing
years. The large cohorts of those born in the 1960s and 1970s
will cause population to continue to grow for many years.
2. SEX RATIO
The sex ratio, the number of males per 100 females, is an
important indicator to sociologists and economists, since the sex
ratio has significant impact on socioeconomic development. Many
aspect of economic planning require separate population data for
males and females. The balance of the sexes affects social and
42
. In China, the central government can strongly influence
the most important variable N in our population growth function
by strictly regulating the number of children per couple.
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economic relationships within a society. Social roles and
cultural patterns may be affected. For example, under the
condition of the male "shortage" brought about by World War II,
the labor force participation and the occupational distribution
of women in the United States, Canada, and several European
countries underwent considerable change and a new pattern of
social relationships between sexes emerged, including a greatly
increased independence of women from the home. The sex ratio of
a population largely depends upon the relative mortality of males
and females and, where there is substantial migration, on the
age-sex distribution of the migrants inflow or outflow. Because
of war, immigration, natural disaster and national tradition, the
sex ratio varies from country to country. Major wars generally
lower the sex ratio due to substantial male mortality.
Obviously, a population which receives more male than female
migrants tends to have a higher sex ratio. Without these
influences, males and females in a nation are usually equal.
In the population growth function, we introduced a female
population ratio function s(a)
,
s(a, t) = F(a, t) / P(a, t)
.
(2)
where F(a, t) is the number of females aged a at time t, and
P(a, t) is the total population aged a at time t.
A more widely used measure of sex composition in technical
studies is the sex ratio defined as the number of males per 100
females. Here I define this ratio MS as a function of time and
age,
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MS (a, t) = [ M(a, t) / F(a, t) ] * 100 (3)
where M(a, t) is the number of males aged a at time t. One
hundred is the point of balance of the sexes according to this
measure. A sex ratio above 100 denotes an excess of males and a
sex ratio below 100 denotes an excess of females. In general,
national sex ratios tend to fall in the narrow range from about
95 to 102, barring special circumstances, such as a history of
heavy war losses or heavy immigration. National sex ratios
outside the range of 90 to 105 are to be viewed as extreme. 43 It
has been observed that in many parts of China, especially in some
rural areas, the infant sex ratio has already lost balance.
Although empirical data about the sex ratio in the nation as a
whole are not available, regional imbalance of sex ratio are
often reported by the official media. The public has begun to
worry if there will be enough women to match men in the next
generation, and worry about the severe social and psychological
problems which a continuation of female infanticide will create.
It is quite obvious what will happen if all couples want their
only child to be a boy. Assume this extreme happens, who can
guarantee that they will have grandchildren if their sons cannot
find girls to marry. Another problem arises: according to
Chinese tradition and life style, at least one son of a family
will live with the parents after he gets married so that there
will be somebody to help the parents when they get older. The
43
. The Methods and Materials of Demography
, p. 191,
volume 1, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington D.C., 1971
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wife is therefore supposed to live with the husband's family.
This is a important factor to keep Chinese families stable. Even
if we assume there is no female infanticide, and the sex ratio is
exactly 1:1, this will still mean that the fifty percent of
parents with only a daughter will have to live alone for their
rest of life after their daughters get married. The government
has realized the problem and has been trying to encourage newly-
wed husbands to live with wives' families and protect their legal
right. However, in an one-child-per-family society, there will
still be fifty percent parents living a sad and lonely old life.
This will not change at least before a well-developed social
security and welfare system is established, without taking into
account people's preference for big family life style. 44
From table 1, we find that the male and female ratio reached
the closest point during the late 1960s period. During that
time, China was in the big mess of the Cultural Revolution and
everything, including population planning, was out of order. The
female ratio began to decrease in 1980.
3. AGE COMPOSITION
Age composition is one of the most important economic and
social aspects of a population. The economic, political, and
other behavior of the representative individual changes with age
44
. In addition to the traditional belief that more
children means more blessing, as we discussed before, Chinese
also believe that three or more generations living in a family
means special blessing and is a sign of prosperity to the family
clan.
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both because mental and physical abilities improve with age up to
a certain level and eventually deteriorate, and because
intangible capital—such as concrete knowledge, learning skills,
etc.—accumulates with training and experience and with age up to
a certain level. Social scientists of many types have a special
interest in the age structure of a population since social
relationships within a country are considerably affected by the
relative numbers at each age. Age is an important variable in
measuring potential school population, potential voting
population, potential manpower and labor force, and even in
projecting consumption patterns.
A population's age structure is governed by the behavior of
its age-specific mortality and fertility, particularly the
latter. "A population whose mortality and fertility remain
invariable tends to become the stable population corresponding to
such levels of mortality and fertility." 45 The constant rate of
population growth (whether positive, negative, or zero)
characteristic of this stable population depends upon the sets of
age-specific fertility and mortality rates underlying this
population. If age-specific fertility and/or age-specific
mortality vary over time, the crude rate of natural increase and
the age structure of the population will vary. For instance, the
heavy mortality associated with war, famine, or virulent
epidemics gives rise to ups or downs in the segments of the age
45
. United Nations, "The Concept of a Stable Population",
Population Studies
. No. 39. New York, 1968, p. 5.
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structure most vulnerable to these events, as was the case of
China's great depression and famine from 1960 to 1962.
Similarly, an upsurge of fertility after a war or a great
economic depression will give rise to abnormally large cohorts,
which thereafter move through a population as a pig swallowed by
a large serpent moves through its body. In other words, great
upsurges in births give rise to a series of echo effects every 2
or more years, but with each smaller than its predecessor until
the echo effect disappears. This is why even though Chinese
government tried every effort to keep the fertility rate down,
the absolute increase now is still significant. As we discussed
earlier, the echo effect of the baby boom in 1960s will keep
China's natural population growth rate high for years.
The wealth of a society is created by human beings,
especially by people with working ability. People without
working ability—senior citizen, handicapped, and children—need
to be supported with the wealth produced by them when they had
the working ability and by the current labor force. If labor
force has to support a large non-working population in a country,
the burden to the country is heavy.
In order to reflect this characteristics quantitatively, we
now introduce the dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is
defined as the number of persons in a population who are not
economically active per 100 economically active persons in that
population
.
The dependency ratio SD at time t is the ratio between
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non-labor force and labor force, and it can be defined as
SD(t) = { P(t) - L(t) } / L(t) (4)
where P(t) is total population at time t and L(t) is labor
force at time t. Here L is defined to be everyone from 15-64.
The so-defined SD here measures how many non-working
population each working person has to support. China's
dependency ratio in 1983 was 0.62. This means that each worker
supports 0.62 non-worker.
In real life, senior citizens and children have different
consumption function and social activity structure, and the needs
for goods and services are different. This difference has a
substantial influence upon economic activity, such as the
production, consumption and social welfare system. In order to
solve this problem, we now bring in old dependency ratio and
young dependency ratio.
The old dependency ratio of a country at time t OD(t)can be
defined as
0D(t) = 0(t) / L(t) (5)
Similarly, we can define young dependency ratio as
YD(a, t) = Y(t) / L(t) (6)
The following table shows the different dependency ratios
resulting from different population policy assumptions, ranging
from N=1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.3 to 3.0.
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Table 9 . 46 100-YEAR PROJECTION OF DEPENDENCY RATIO
(1980-2080)
Year N = 1.0 N = 1.5 N = 2.0 N = 2.3 N = 3.0
1980 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
1985 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.58
1990 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.54
1995 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.50 0.62
2000 0.31 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.64
2005 0.33 0.41 0.48 0.52 0.61
2010 0.32 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.56
2015 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.56
2020 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.61
2025 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.56 0.65
2030 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.69
2035 0.82 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.71
2040 1.08 0.86 0.76 0.73 0.72
2045 1.24 0.90 0.75 0.72 0.70
2050 1.34 0.91 0.76 0.73 0.74
2055 1.34 0.92 0.78 0.75 0.75
2060 1.34 0.94 0.80 0.77 0.76
2065 1.33 0.95 0.81 0.77 0.76
2070 1.38 0.99 0.83 0.78 0.76
2075 1.44 1.01 0.84 0.79 0.76
2080 1.48 1.02 0.84 0.79 0.77
The computation indicates that the tighter the population
policy, the higher the dependency ratio will be. It must be
pointed out that under any of the five assumptions, the weights
of dependent age groups in dependency ratio will gradually shift
from 0-4 to 65 and over, so the aged dependency ratio rises in
all series. It must also be pointed out that not only the
46
. The computation of this table is based on the data from
tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, respectively, with equation (4), that is,
the dependency ratio (SD) at time t is:
SD(t) = { P(t) - L(t) } / L(t),
where L(t)
,
the total labor force, is defined as the age group
15-64.
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proportion 65 and over in all five series rises, but also the
proportion 15-64 decreases, causing a greater dependency burden,
with smaller N than with greater N. These results can be seen in
tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. We should realize that even though the
dependency ratio does not vary so much in the next one or two
decades, the aged dependents need much more costly services than
young dependents. The more rapid the decline in fertility, the
faster the population aging. This is because the effect of
fertility reductions will immediately cause low proportions of
younger ages and high proportions of older ages. In addition,
when mortality is already at low levels at young and adult ages,
it is clear that further reduction can only occur at older ages.
Thus the different total fertility rates of the different
population policies will have different effects on dependency
ratio.
According to definitions used by United Nations
organizations, a person who is above 60 years old is regarded as
an old person. A country or region where 10 percent of the total
population are over 60—or 7 percent of the population over 65
—
falls under the category of "aging nation." The aging problem
and its growth trend are attracting national and world attention.
At the end of this century, Chinese population will start to
become aged. Long time sustained low fertility rate and low
death rate will lead to a aging society. According to a
projection, as the fertility rate declines, the proportion of
population 65 years and older will increase and reach about 7 .
2
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percent of the total population in the year of 2000. 47 It will
have some impacts upon the quantity and quality of China's labor
force. This will also increase the burden of the society.
The median age of the Chinese population declined from 1953
to 1964 and then started to increase up to 27.1 in 1982; it is
expected to continue to increase until the large cohorts of mid-
1962 to 1978 disappear. Given the rapidly declining fertility
and relatively steady and low mortality, the Chinese population
is therefore expected to age significantly during the coming
decades. According to the result of a one-percent sample survey
conducted in July 1, 1987, compared to the result of 1982 census,
the proportion of young population aged to 14 decreased from
33.45 percent in 1982 to 28.68 percent, while aged population
increased from 4.89 percent to 5.46 percent. 48
According to the 1982 census, people over 60 made up 7.6
percent of the total nation, but this figure is expected to rise
to 10 percent by 1995, when there will be 120 million elderly
people. 49 Some big cities have already become or are bordering
on aging status. In Shanghai, 12.5 percent of the city's
population are over 60. In Beijing and Tianjin, the figures are
47
. "The Growth Trend of Our Aging Population", by the
Population Division, the State Statistical Bureau, Guangming
Daily . February 24, 1986, (in Chinese).
48
. Report from the State Statistical Bureau regarding to
the July 1, 1987 one percent sample survey, People's Daily ,
(Overseas Edition), November, 12, 1987, (in Chinese).
49
. "The Aging Problem Looms Large in China", China Daily ,
Vol. 5, No. 1507, May 24, 1986.
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9.2 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively. In Shanghai, the
number of retired people increased by 170 percent between 1978
and 1984, and pensions spending went up to 18.5 percent of the
municipal wage bill. In addition, medical care, social welfare,
and daily services for the old also require money.
The negative impacts of aging population upon production and
economic development also include:
1) The pension is counted into the total cost of production
in Chinese accounting system. The ever-increasing retired
population will boost costs and thus reduce profits. This has
already become a painful problem in some developed industrial
countries.
2) The increase of the proportion of old population will
cause expansion of aggregate consumption expense. In China, the
demand for old people's clothing, food, entertainment, health
care and other services is among the biggest in the world. This
will reduce capital accumulation and severely slow down the
expansion of reproduction.
3) The aging population will deepen the existing conflict
in national income distribution. In 1985, Chinese government
paid 14.56 billion Yuan46 to 16,370,000 retired State- and
collective-owned business and institution employees, the average
pension per worker was 935 Yuan, which was no less than the
average wage on-job employees. The extent of such an irrational
income distribution will increase as the aged population
46
. Chinese currency unit.
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increases. These problems all need to be taken care of before
they start to slow down the economic development.
Some people suggest that we raise fertility level later to
offset the growing number of aged population in order to reduce
its proportion in the total population. However, this approach
does nothing to reduce the burden on working age population,
since it adds more young dependents but does not reduce the
number of old people the workers must support. Thus, in order to
ease the dependency burden, such an approach as raising the
fertility level must be initiated well before the beginning of
the population aging. Therefore, we need to take into account
the time lag of implementation of a policy and the response to
it. When the negative effects of aging population becomes
visible, it is too late to implement policy changes.
4. OUTPUT PER CAPITA
One common challenge to rapid population growth is that such
rapid growth population will reduce the growth of output per
capita. The larger the population size is, the lower the output
per capita will be, holding total output constant. However,
total output is not fixed. Instead, it is a function of labor
force which itself is a function of population, therefore
population can also affect output.
In this section, I project output per capita under different
fertility assumptions (N) . I assume a Cobb-Douglas production
function, characterized by constant returns to scale, with only
63
two inputs, capital (K) and labor (L) . The model takes the form:
Q(t) = K(t) W L(t) X « (7)
where (X is the exponent on capital, representing the elasticity
of output with respect to capital. Different values of N and
will be used in the simulation to determine how sensitive the
path of output per capita is to different N and Qf. Labor force
projections are those presented in the first section of this
chapter. Since we have already argued there that N=2.3 and N=3
are clearly not desirable population policies, our interest here
is to see what will be the desired policy among N=l, N=1.5 and
N=2. Therefore, only these three assumptions for N will be used.
Capital is assumed to grow through time as a function of
total output. Specifically, capital at any year time t is equal
to capital at year t-5 plus an amount proportional to total
output at year t-5. In order to simplify the model, I also
assume that there is no technical change during the whole
projection period. The assumption is not important because the
impact of technical change would be to increase the absolute
values of the output index under any fertility assumption by a
same proportion.
The simulation procedure operates as follows. The earlier
population forecasts for N=1.0, N=1.5 and N=2.0 determine total
population and labor force for each fifth year from 1980 to 2080.
Output in year t is then determined as a function of labor and
capital available in year t. Capital in year t+5 is then
determined as a function of capital in year t and output in year
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t. Then, along with labor in year t+5, the production function
determines output in year t+5. The model is thus driven by the
exogenously determined labor force and endogenously determined
capital stock.
The results of the projection are contained in three tables
in the appendix. Each of these table contains three population-
labor forecast (N=1.0, N=1.5, and N=2.0). To ease comparison, the
variables (population, labor, capital stock and output) are all
indexed, with 1980=1.000. The three tables use different
combination of QL and k. The first table assumes Of =0.15 and
k=0.30, which means that the index of capital stock in year t+5
is equal to the index of capital in year t plus 30 percent of the
output index in year t. The second table uses Of =0.25 and
k=0.30, and the third uses Of =0.25 and k=0.15.
The first projection assumes Of =0 . 15 and k=0.30. This means
that capital stock at every 5-year interval is equal to capital
stock 5-year earlier plus 0.3 of the output index in that year.
Under N=l assumption, in 2080 total population will be 0.614 of
total labor force of 1980, and total labor force in 2080 is only
0.247 of total labor force of 1980. There is a 66.8 percent
increase in output per worker, as the result of higher K/L ratio,
but note that total output decreases by 58.8 percent because of
the decline of working population. There is a slight increase in
output per capita. The high dependency rate almost offsets the
result of higher productivity per worker. On the other hand, the
more moderate fertility assumptions N=1.5 and N=2, not only give
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higher total output and therefore greater capital stock
accumulation, but also give higher output per capita in the long-
run. The N=1.5 assumption gives the highest output per capita
after 2035. In comparison to the N=1.0 case, in these latter two
cases, the lower output per worker is more than offset by the
lower dependency ratio ( the ratio of dependents to workers)
.
In the second simulation we keep k=0.3, but now assume that
Of =0.25. The N=1.5 assumption gives higher total output, and
higher capital accumulation and output per capita, compared to
the corresponding results assuming N=l. However, N=2 gives a
lower output per capita, even though it gives the highest total
output and capital accumulation. In this case, it is true that
the larger population increases the denominator under a given
output level, and such a larger population more than offsets the
additional output produced by a larger labor force. Note that
the absolute differences of output per capita among three sets
are smaller with Qf=0.15 (simulation 1) than with OL =0.25
(simulation 2) . The more labor-intensive the economy is, the
more sensitive the output is to population growth rate.
In the third simulation we assume OL =0.25 and k=0.15. The
projection gives us almost the same result as under d =0.25 and
k=0 . 3 , as we see from computation of comparisons , except that
higher capital growth gives same proportional increase of
absolute total output under any of fertility assumptions. This
finding also indicates that capital stock growth assumption will
not have significant impact on the validity of the projection.
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APPENDIX 1. PER CAPITA OUTPUT PROJECTIONS
Table 10 . Projection 1.
Assumptions: 0.15 (the exponent on capital (K) in Cobb-Douglas CRS
production function)
0.30 (5-year growth of capital stock as proportion of
output at beginning of period)
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
N = 1 Population 978 1008 1021 1037 1050
Labor 603 693 765 798 803
Dependents 375 315 256 239 247
Population (Index) 1.622 1.672 1.693 1.720 1.741
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.332
N = 1.5 Population 978 1012 1048 1091 1130
Labor 603 693 765 798 807
Dependents 375 319 283 293 323
Population (Index) 1.622 1.678 1.738 1.809 1.874
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.338
N=2 Population 978 1028 1088 1157 1222
Labor 603 693 765 798 822
Dependents 375 335 323 359 400
Population (Index) 1.622 1.705 1.804 1.919 2.027
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.363
K stock (N=l) 1.000 1.300 1.651 2.047 2.471
Output 1.000 1.171 1.320 1.413 1.461
Output/Popu. 0.617 0.700 0.779 0.822 0.839
Output/Labor 1.000 1.019 1.040 1.068 1.097
K stock (N=1.5) 1.000 1.300 1.651 2.047 2.471
Output 1.000 1.171 1.320 1.413 1.467
Output/Population 0.617 0.698 0.759 0.781 0.783
Output/Labor 1.000 1.019 1.040 1.068 1.096
K stock (N=2) 1.000 1.300 1.651 2.047 2.471
Output 1.000 1.171 1.320 1.413 1.490
Output/Population 0.617 0.687 0.731 0.736 0.735
Output/Labor 1.000 1.019 1.040 1.068 1.093
Comparisons O/P 1.000 1.004 1.026 1.052 1.072
(N=1)/(N=1.5) 0/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
Comparisons 0/P 1.000 1.020 1.066 1.116 1.141
(N=1)/(N=2) 0/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.004
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Table 10. (continued)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
1053 1044 1025 1003 978 951 919 878
794 788 767 724 681 599 506 422
259 256 258 279 297 352 413 456
1.746 1.731 1.700 1.663 1.622 1.577 1.524 1.456
1.317 1.307 1.272 1.201 1.129 0.993 0.839 0.700
1155 1167 1171 1175 1178 1177 1169 1150
820 841 846 825 801 741 674 617
335 326 325 350 377 436 495 533
1.915 1.935 1.942 1.949 1.954 1.952 1.939 1.907
1.360 1.395 1.403 1.368 1.328 1.229 1.118 1.023
1272 1310 1346 1388 1431 1469 1498 1518
859 906 936 939 941 913 881 863
413 404 410 449 490 556 617 655
2.109 2.172 2.232 2.302 2.373 2.436 2.484 2.517
1.425 1.502 1.552 1.557 1.561 1.514 1.461 1.431
2.909 3.354 3.806 4.256 4.691 5.111 5.492 5.825
1.483 1.505 1.499 1.452 1.398 1.270 1.112 0.962
0.849 0.869 0.882 0.873 0.862 0.805 0.730 0.660
1.126 1.152 1.179 1.209 1.238 1.279 1.325 1.374
2.911 3.368 3.846 4.336 4.824 5.307 5.766 6.195
1.524 1.592 1.632 1.627 1.612 1.530 1.430 1.341
0.796 0.823 0.840 0.835 0.825 0.784 0.737 0.703
1.121 1.141 1.163 1.189 1.213 1.245 1.279 1.310
2.918 3.394 3.903 4.438 4.985 5.542 6.094 6.637
1.586 1.698 1.783 1.822 1.857 1.839 1.810 1.801
0.752 0.782 0.799 0.792 0.783 0.755 0.729 0.716
1.114 1.130 1.148 1.170 1.190 1.215 1.239 1.259
1.067 1.057 1.049 1.045 1.045 1.027 0.990 0.940
1.005 1.009 1.013 1.017 1.020 1.027 1.036 1.049
1.129 1.112 1.104 1.102 1.101 1.067 1.002 0.923
1.011 1.019 1.026 1.033 1.040 1.052 1.070 1.092
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Table 10. (continued)
2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080
825 771 701 613 523 457 407 370
368 329 300 262 224 192 167 149
457 442 401 351 299 265 240 221
1.368 1.279 1.163 1.017 0.867 0.758 0.675 0.614
0.610 0.546 0.498 0.434 0.371 0.318 0.277 0.247
1119 1087 1039 972 901 853 819 781
589 569 541 501 461 429 407 387
530 518 498 471 440 424 412 394
1.856 1.803 1.723 1.612 1.494 1.415 1.358 1.295
0.977 0.944 0.897 0.831 0.765 0.711 0.675 0.642
1529 1542 1540 1517 1491 1488 1492 1483
872 876 865 841 822 813 812 806
657 666 675 676 669 675 680 677
2.536 2.557 2.554 2.516 2.473 2.468 2.474 2.459
1.446 1.453 1.434 1.395 1.363 1.348 1.347 1.337
6.114 6.372 6.609 6.829 7.026 7.199 7.352 7.488
0.862 0.789 0.733 0.657 0.577 0.508 0.453 0.412
0.630 0.617 0.631 0.646 0.666 0.671 0.671 0.672
1.413 1.446 1.474 1.512 1.554 1.596 1.635 1.668
6.597 6.988 7.370 7.739 8.087 8.414 8.723 9.021
1.301 1.274 1.230 1.161 1.089 1.031 0.991 0.954
0.701 0.707 0.714 0.720 0.729 0.729 0.729 0.737
1.332 1.350 1.371 1.398 1.425 1.449 1.468 1.487
7.177 7.729 8.289 8.849 9.401 9.947 10.493 11.043
1.839 1.867 1.866 1.840 1.821 1.820 1.832 1.835
0.725 0.730 0.731 0.731 0.737 0.737 0.741 0.746
1.272 1.285 1.301 1.319 1.336 1.350 1.361 1.373
0.899 0.873 0.883 0.897 0.913 0.921 0.920 0.912
1.061 1.071 1.075 1.082 1.091 1.102 1.114 1.122
0.869 0.845 0.863 0.883 0.904 0.910 0.906 0.900
1.111 1.125 1.133 1.146 1.163 1.183 1.202 1.215
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Table 11 . Projection 2.
Assumptions
:
0.25 (the exponent on capital (K) in Cobb-Douglas CRS
production function)
0.30 (5-year growth of capital stock as proportion of
output at beginning of period)
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
N = 1 Population 978 1008 1021 1037 1050
Labor 603 693 765 798 803
Dependents 375 315 256 239 247
Population (Index) 1.622 1.672 1.693 1.720 1.741
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.332
N = 1.5 Population 978 1012 1048 1091 1130
Labor 603 693 765 798 807
Dependents 375 319 283 293 323
Population (Index) 1.622 1.678 1.738 1.809 1.874
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.338
N=2 Population 978 1028 1088 1157 1222
Labor 603 693 765 798 822
Dependents 375 335 323 359 400
Population (Index) 1.622 1.705 1.804 1.919 2.027
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.363
K stock (N=l) 1.000 1.300 1.656 2.062 2.506
Output 1.000 1.185 1.356 1.479 1.560
Output/Popu. 0.617 0.709 0.801 0.860 0.896
Output/Labor 1.000 1.031 1.069 1.117 1.171
K stock (N=1.5) 1.000 1.300 1.656 2.062 2.506
Output 1.000 1.185 1.356 1.479 1.566
Output/Population 0.617 0.706 0.780 0.817 0.835
Output/Labor 1.000 1.031 1.069 1.117 1.170
K stock (N=2) 1.000 1.300 1.656 2.062 2.506
Output 1.000 1.185 1.356 1.479 1.587
Output/Population 0.617 0.695 0.752 0.771 0.783
Output/Labor 1.000 1.031 1.069 1.117 1.164
Comparisons O/P 1.000 1.004 1.026 1.052 1.072
(N=1)/(N=1.5) 0/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
Comparisons O/P 1.000 1.020 1.066 1.116 1.144
(N=1)/(N=2) 0/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006
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Table 11. (continued)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
1053 1044 1025 1003 978 951 919 878
794 788 767 724 681 599 506 422
259 256 258 279 297 352 413 456
1.746 1.731 1.700 1.663 1.622 1.577 1.524 1.456
1.317 1.307 1.272 1.201 1.129 0.993 0.839 0.700
1155 1167 1171 1175 1178 1177 1169 1150
820 841 846 825 801 741 674 617
335 326 325 350 377 436 495 533
1.915 1.935 1.942 1.949 1.954 1.952 1.939 1.907
1.360 1.395 1.403 1.368 1.328 1.229 1.118 1.023
1272 1310 1346 1388 1431 1469 1498 1518
859 906 936 939 941 913 881 863
413 404 410 449 490 556 617 655
2.109 2.172 2.232 2.302 2.373 2.436 2.484 2.517
1.425 1.502 1.552 1.557 1.561 1.514 1.461 1.431
2.974 3.458 3.958 4.465 4.965 5.456 5.912 6.322
1.614 1.667 1.689 1.667 1.635 1.521 1.367 1.213
0.924 0.963 0.994 1.002 1.008 0.964 0.897 0.833
1.226 1.275 1.328 1.389 1.448 1.531 1.629 1.734
2.976 3.472 3.997 4.544 5.098 5.656 6.196 6.711
1.654 1.752 1.823 1.847 1.859 1.800 1.715 1.637
0.863 0.905 0.939 0.948 0.952 0.922 0.885 0.859
1.216 1.256 1.299 1.350 1.400 1.465 1.534 1.600
2.982 3.496 4.053 4.645 5.259 5.893 6.531 7.168
1.714 1.856 1.973 2.046 2.114 2.127 2.124 2.141
0.812 0.854 0.884 0.889 0.891 0.873 0.855 0.850
1.203 1.235 1.271 1.314 1.355 1.405 1.454 1.496
1.071 1.064 1.059 1.058 1.059 1.046 1.014 0.971
1.008 1.015 1.022 1.029 1.035 1.045 1.062 1.083
1.138 1.127 1.124 1.127 1.132 1.105 1.049 0.980
1.019 1.033 1.045 1.057 1.069 1.090 1.120 1.159
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Table 11. (continued)
2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080
825 771 701 613 523 457 407 370
368 329 300 262 224 192 167 149
457 442 401 351 299 265 240 221
1.368 1.279 1.163 1.017 0.867 0.758 0.675 0.614
0.610 0.546 0.498 0.434 0.371 0.318 0.277 0.247
1119 1087 1039 972 901 853 819 781
589 569 541 501 461 429 407 387
530 518 498 471 440 424 412 394
1.856 1.803 1.723 1.612 1.494 1.415 1.358 1.295
0.977 0.944 0.897 0.831 0.765 0.711 0.675 0.642
1529 1542 1540 1517 1491 1488 1492 1483
872 876 865 841 822 813 812 806
657 666 675 676 669 675 680 677
2.536 2.557 2.554 2.516 2.473 2.468 2.474 2.459
1.446 1.453 1.434 1.395 1.363 1.348 1.347 1.337
6.686 7.019 7.329 7.622 7.888 8.128 8.342 8.537
1.110 1.033 0.975 0.889 0.797 0.716 0.649 0.599
0.812 0.808 0.838 0.875 0.919 0.944 0.961 0.976
1.819 1.894 1.959 2.047 2.147 2.248 2.343 2.424
7.202 7.685 8.163 8.630 9.078 9.504 9.912 10.308
1.610 1.594 1.558 1.492 1.419 1.360 1.321 1.285
0.867 0.884 0.904 0.925 0.950 0.961 0.973 0.992
1.648 1.689 1.737 1.795 1.856 1.912 1.958 2.002
7.811 8.472 9.149 9.833 10.515 11.197 11.883 12.579
2.205 2.258 2.280 2.273 2.272 2.289 2.321 2.341
0.869 0.883 0.893 0.903 0.919 0.928 0.938 0.952
1.524 1.554 1.589 1.630 1.667 1.698 1.724 1.752
0.936 0.914 0.927 0.945 0.968 0.982 0.988 0.984
1.104 1.121 1.128 1.140 1.156 1.176 1.197 1.211
0.933 0.915 0.939 0.968 1.001 1.018 1.025 1.026
1.193 1.219 1.233 1.256 1.288 1.324 1.359 1.384
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Table 12 . Projection 3.
Assumptions: 0.25 (the exponent on capital (K) in Cobb-Douglas CRS
production function)
0.15 (5-year growth of capital stock as proportion of
output at beginning of period)
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
N = 1 Population 978 1008 1021 1037 1050
Labor 603 693 765 798 803
Dependents 375 315 256 239 247
Population (Index) 1.622 1.672 1.693 1.720 1.741
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.332
N = 1.5 Population 978 1012 1048 1091 1130
Labor 603 693 765 798 807
Dependents 375 319 283 293 323
Population (Index) 1.622 1.678 1.738 1.809 1.874
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.338
N=2 Population 978 1028 1088 1157 1222
Labor 603 693 765 798 822
Dependents 375 335 323 359 400
Population (Index) 1.622 1.705 1.804 1.919 2.027
Labor (Index) 1.000 1.149 1.269 1.323 1.363
K stock (N=l) 1.000 1.150 1.322 1.515 1.720
Output 1.000 1.149 1.282 1.369 1.420
Output/Popu. 0.617 0.688 0.757 0.796 0.815
Output/Labor 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.034 1.066
K stock (N=1.5) 1.000 1.150 1.322 1.515 1.720
Output 1.000 1.149 1.282 1.369 1.425
Output/Population 0.617 0.685 0.738 0.757 0.760
Output/Labor 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.034 1.065
K stock (N=2) 1.000 1.150 1.322 1.515 1.720
Output 1.000 1.149 1.282 1.369 1.445
Output/Population 0.617 0.674 0.710 0.713 0.713
Output/Labor 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.034 1.060
Comparisons 0/P 1.000 1.004 1.026 1.052 1.072
(N=1)/(N=1.5) O/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
Comparisons 0/P 1.000 1.020 1.066 1.116 1.144
(N=1)/(N=2) 0/L 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006
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Table 12. (continued)
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
1053 1044 1025 1003 978 951 919 878
794 788 767 724 681 599 506 422
259 256 258 279 297 352 413 456
1.746 1.731 1.700 1.663 1.622 1.577 1.524 1.456
1.317 1.307 1.272 1.201 1.129 0.993 0.839 0.700
1155 1167 1171 1175 1178 1177 1169 1150
820 841 846 825 801 741 674 617
335 326 325 350 377 436 495 533
1.915 1.935 1.942 1.949 1.954 1.952 1.939 1.907
1.360 1.395 1.403 1.368 1.328 1.229 1.118 1.023
1272 1310 1346 1388 1431 1469 1498 1518
859 906 936 939 941 913 881 863
413 404 410 449 490 556 617 655
2.109 2.172 2.232 2.302 2.373 2.436 2.484 2.517
1.425 1.502 1.552 1.557 1.561 1.514 1.461 1.431
1.933 2.150 2.372 2.595 2.814 3.027 3.223 3.400
1.449 1.480 1.486 1.456 1.419 1.312 1.175 1.039
0.830 0.855 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.832 0.771 0.714
1.101 1.133 1.169 1.213 1.256 1.321 1.400 1.485
1.934 2.157 2.390 2.630 2.872 3.113 3.346 3.567
1.485 1.555 1.603 1.611 1.611 1.550 1.470 1.398
0.775 0.804 0.825 0.827 0.825 0.794 0.758 0.733
1.092 1.115 1.142 1.178 1.213 1.262 1.315 1.366
1.937 2.167 2.414 2.674 2.942 3.216 3.490 3.763
1.538 1.647 1.734 1.783 1.829 1.828 1.816 1.822
0.729 0.758 0.777 0.774 0.771 0.750 0.731 0.724
1.080 1.096 1.117 1.145 1.172 1.207 1.243 1.273
1.071 1.064 1.060 1.059 1.061 1.048 1.016 0.973
1.008 1.016 1.023 1.030 1.036 1.047 1.064 1.087
1.138 1.128 1.126 1.130 1.135 1.109 1.054 0.986
1.019 1.033 1.046 1.059 1.072 1.094 1.126 1.166
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Table 12. (continued)
2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080
825 771 701 613 523 457 407 370
368 329 300 262 224 192 167 149
457 442 401 351 299 265 240 221
1.368 1.279 1.163 1.017 0.867 0.758 0.675 0.614
0.610 0.546 0.498 0.434 0.371 0.318 0.277 0.247
1119 1087 1039 972 901 853 819 781
589 569 541 501 461 429 407 387
530 518 498 471 440 424 412 394
1.856 1.803 1.723 1.612 1.494 1.415 1.358 1.295
0.977 0.944 0.897 0.831 0.765 0.711 0.675 0.642
1529 1542 1540 1517 1491 1488 1492 1483
872 876 865 841 822 813 812 806
657 666 675 676 669 675 680 677
2.536 2.557 2.554 2.516 2.473 2.468 2.474 2.459
1.446 1.453 1.434 1.395 1.363 1.348 1.347 1.337
3.555 3.698 3.830 3.954 4.067 4.169 4.259 4.342
0.948 0.880 0.829 0.755 0.676 0.606 0.548 0.506
0.693 0.689 0.713 0.742 0.779 0.799 0.813 0.824
1.554 1.613 1.666 1.737 1.819 1.902 1.980 2.047
3.776 3.982 4.185 4.382 4.571 4.751 4.922 5.088
1.370 1.352 1.318 1.259 1.195 1.144 1.109 1.077
0.738 0.750 0.765 0.781 0.800 0.808 0.817 0.831
1.402 1.433 1.470 1.515 1.564 1.608 1.643 1.678
4.036 4.317 4.603 4.891 5.177 5.462 5.749 6.040
1.869 1.907 1.920 1.909 1.903 1.913 1.936 1.949
0.737 0.746 0.752 0.759 0.770 0.775 0.782 0.792
1.293 1.313 1.338 1.368 1.396 1.419 1.437 1.458
0.939 0.918 0.932 0.950 0.974 0.989 0.995 0.992
1.108 1.126 1.133 1.146 1.163 1.183 1.205 1.220
0.940 0.923 0.948 0.979 1.012 1.031 1.039 1.040
1.202 1.229 1.245 1.269 1.303 1.341 1.378 1.404
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APPENDIX 2. MATHEMATICAL NOTES47
The population growth process in an area (a state, a county,
a province, a country, or even the world) can be formally
modeled. Assume the quantity of population change in the area is
a function of time and age distribution; we now introduce a
function with two continuous variables, P(a, t) , where a is age
and t is time. P(a, t) represents the total population under the
age of a at time t. This function P(a, t) is population
function. Based on definition, P(a, t) is always greater than or
equal to zero. That is, for any a and t, P(a, t) > 0.
Furthermore, for any fixed t, that is, at any given time t, if a]_
< a2 , it must be true that P(a^, t) < P(a2 , t) . This tells us
that P(a, t) is an increasing function of a. Assume z is the
maximum life expectancy/ according to above characteristics, we
have:
P(0, t) = (1)
P(z, t) = P(t) (2)
Strictly speaking, the population function P(a, t) is the
step function of the two independent variables. But if the
population base is very large, and if a and t are continuous, we
can treat P(a, t) as being continuous in every variable. We
assume furthermore that the first partial derivatives of P(a, t)
,
47
. The model was established by the work of Song Jian,
Tian Xueyuan and other Chinese scientists and first introduced in
Population Projection and Population Control , Song Jian, Tian
Xueyuan, Beijing: 1982, (in Chinese).
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and
P-t-(a, t) =QP /Qt are also continuous functions.
Assume p(a, t) = (jP /Q a. Here p(a, t) is population age
distribution density function, or simply population density
function. According to the increasing characteristics of the
population function P(a, t) and properties (1) and (2) , we have:
P(a / t) > and p(z, t) = (3)
If A a is a very small age interval, and a. a > 0, then total
population within age interval [a, a +^a] at time t is p{a, t}.
Since p{a, t} = qP /(3 a and P{0, t} = 0, we have:
(4)
(5)
For any small value a, the total population aged between a-^ and
a2 (a2 > al) a*- time t is:
fa2
(6)
A very important parameter in the population growth
function is death rate function, which can be used to describe
the death factor in population growth process. Assume that the
number of people within age interval [a, a+A a ] died at time t
is D{a, t} A a / an^ that those who survived and entered the next
age group is p{a, t} a. The death ratio function is defined as:
d{a, t} = lim [ D(a, t) a / p(a, t) a ]
.
(7)
The main sources of a country's population gain are
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immigrants and new-borne children. Since immigration has very
small impact upon China's population growth, our major concern is
to study the trend and policy related to new borne children.
There are four main determinants of the guantity of new borne
population in a year: (1) Number of people in birth age and their
age distribution, (2) Percentage of women in the above
population, (3) Individual fertility model, that is, the number
of children per woman and (4) Aggregate social average fertility
model. In this paper we discuss the impact of the last factor.
We use B(t) to denote the number of new borne children in
year t, s(a, t) to denote the percentage of women among total
population in fertility age (which is a function of age a and
time t) , and [al, a2] to denote women's fertility interval (that
is, if the minimum marriage age is 18 and the maximum age that a
woman still has the ability to give birth is 50, the fertility
interval will be [18, 50]).
Let p(a, t) denote the population at time t and age
a( let a = 1) , and the number of women at that age is
s(a, t)p(a, t) . The average number of children who were given
birth by s(a, t)*p(a, t) women at time t is B(a, t) . Letting
R(a, t) be a ratio function, we have:
R(a, t) = B(a, t) / { s(a, t) * p(a, t) }, (8)
and
B(a, t) = s(a, t) * R(a, t) * p(a, t)
.
(9)
The number of children produced by the total number of women
in their fertility age at given time interval is:
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50
s(a, t) * R(a, t) * p(a, t)da. (10)
18
The ratio function R(a, t) depends on two factors. One is
average number of children per woman during her whole life and
two, birth age and interval. We call the latter fertility model.
In order to analyze the two separately, we standardize the ratio
function as:
R(a, t) = N(t) * h(a, t)
,
(11)
h(a, t)dt = 1. (12)
18
In equation (11) , N(a, t) is the number of births each woman
in fertility age gives in a given time interval, or simply the
number of children each woman has in her whole fertility age.
Equation (10) can now be written as:
f50
B(a, t) = N(t) s(a, t)*h(a, t)*p(a, t)da. (13)
J 18
The chapter gives population forecasts for five different
values of N.
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CHAPTER SIX
SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this chapter, some policy implications are discussed, and
alternative policies are suggested. First, parents 1 opportunity
cost for children plays important role in making child-bearing
decision. Opportunity cost of having children is negatively
related to the number of children a couple is willing to have.
Secondly, in present China, the majority of aged people are taken
care of by their descendants in the family. Under the current
population policy, without a well-established social security
system, the increase of one-child families will cause frustration
and social problems, and will also hinder productivity. The
population aging problem associated with tight population control
will also bring severe negative social and economic consequences.
An efficient non-family-based social security system should be
built up in order to ensure elderly for their life. Thirdly, our
study indicates that the geographic distribution of the Chinese
population is very uneven. Although many geographic localities
are harsh for certain types of economic activities, internal
migration is possible given proper economic incentives, so that
population pressure high densities can be relieved and a smooth
and slow population growth rate can be accepted. In order to
achieve these objectives and to encourage voluntary and non-
abortion population planning, the government should promote a
more open and liberal market-oriented economy. Under current
situation, one policy option is to continue to encourage one
child per family, while legally allowing each couple to have up
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to two children.
1. MORE OPEN AND LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY
In a closed economy, the growth in population is determined
by birth and death rates. In more developed countries, birth
rates are largely determined by economic factors rather than by
cultural factors. Since children provide pleasure to their
parents, and parents make outlays and investments on their
children, economists tend to analyze family formation in terms of
the framework provided by consumption theory. In this view,
disposable income, individual preference, and the opportunity
cost of children each play an important role in family planning.
The productivity of a person and his or her education level
are positively related. As peoples' education level increases,
their opportunity of economic activity increases, and when their
economic opportunity increases, the opportunity cost of their
time will also increase. Therefore, we can expect that as the
education level increases, the preference for children will
decrease. Economic opportunity is of course also affected by
economic policy. Despite the fact that it is difficult to get
relevant data to make detailed computation and prediction about
the relationship between the level of education and fertility, we
still can observe that there is negative relationship between
them in China. Table 13 confirms this relationship.
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Table 13 . Correlation Between Education and Fertility
Education Level (1) (2) (3) (4)
National Average
University
Senior High
Junior High
Primary School
Illiterate
17.96
1.23
3.41
9.15
26.75
40.19
9.64
0.82
2.50
5.69
13.74
17.54
4.38
0.17
0.55
1.95
6.76
9.86
3.94
0.24
0.36
1.51
6.25
12.79
Note: (1) Proportion of women with more than two children.
(2) Proportion of women with three children.
(3) Proportion of women with four children.
(4) Proportion of women with more than four children.
Source: China Statistical Year Book. 1984 . The State
Statistical Bureau, p. 101, (in Chinese)
.
This suggests that education is an important factor which
will affect fertility rate. It is not unreasonable to predict
that as their overall educational level increases, people will
more readily cooperate with government family planning program.
Although it is inappropriate to put price tag on children in
real life, in economic analysis we can treat children as special
commodities. If we hold preferences and prices, defined here as
the prices of goods and services for children, constant, then an
increase of disposable income of parents would increase both the
number of children parents would have and the amount of
investment the parents would make in their children, unless some
viewed children as inferior goods. Experience in many developed
countries shows that as income increases, the impact on the
quality side is larger than on the quantity side. This means
that increases in income will make family size increase at a
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decreasing rate, and the investments in children increase at an
increasing rate. 48 In developed countries, and in the upper
classes of developing countries, parents tend to make substantial
expenditures on the education and other measures which increase
the quality of children. Some empirical observations also
confirm the expected negative relation between family size and
the opportunity cost of children. Housing, food, education, and
the opportunity cost of parents' time are obviously cheaper in
developing countries, including China, compared to more developed
countries, and cheaper in rural than in urban areas. This shows
that the substitution effect is larger than income effect.
One important factor contributing to parents' preference for
more children in China, particularly in rural areas, is the
current low level of economic activity. The opportunity cost of
having more children is so low that some parents feel that to
have one more child in the family simply costs another pair of
chopsticks at the dinner table. When a nice family planning
official was trying to explain to a housewife in the countryside
the disadvantage of having more children, the housewife said that
looking after children is just like her husband looking after his
sheep; he would not mind adding another sheep to his flock. Only
when his earning capacity increases will he change his preference
48
. We assume that both the amount of investment parents
would like to make on their children (I) and the number of
children they want to have(N) are functions of income (i) , that
is, I = I(i) and N = N(i) . The first derivatives of I and N with
respect to i are both positive. The second derivative of I with
respect to i is positive, but the second derivative of N with
respect to i is negative.
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for children. This explains why urban families as a whole
usually have relatively fewer children. Recently, since the
Chinese government adopted a more liberal economic policy in
agricultural sectors, farmers in many areas have shifted their
attention from land to some other activities. As their income
levels increase, and also when housewives become involved in more
productive activities, their time becomes more valuable and thus
the opportunity cost of time rises. Many of those new farmers
find they no long have the time to take care of many children.
As they get the chance to see more of the outside world, they
change their expectation for their children: they want their
children to get education and to live better lives. They start
to hire baby-sitters and family tutors to help their children.
In some interviews conducted by the media, many farmers expressed
their new preference for a small family. Also with the more
liberal economic policy, those previously poor farmers will not
only increase their own standard of living, but also make
investment and thus create many employment opportunities. Many
newly improved farmers expressed their intention to reinvest
their gain, but are fearful of ever-changing policies. To
encourage people to voluntarily accept family planning and to
cooperate with the government's effort, the essential and
ultimate point is to provide them with more opportunities, and
let them realize that there are more valuable things they can do.
It should be pointed out that the current economic policy is
contradictory to population policy. Under the current economic
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policy, the larger the family size, the larger the labor force,
the greater the degree of role specialization by sex and
generation, the greater the ability to accumulate tangible
resources, and the larger the social network for obtaining
capital, labor, technology and market information. The incentive
to have more children is reinforced. This also needs to be
overcome
.
2. IMPROVE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM
Taking care of the old people in the family is an important
feature in China and it provides a buffer to the aging problem.
This type of family life style has long been appreciated by
people in China and by other countries of the world. The Chinese
government expects to preserve the family system of social
security and encourages young couples to take care of old people,
in order to meet the needs of the growing number of aged
population. Unfortunately such a system is challenged by the
increasing number of families with only one child that disrupt
the family support system for elderly. The government is facing
a serious dilemma between the macro-demographic impacts of
population policy on total population size and population aging
on the one hand, and the micro-demographic effects on the
family's ability to support the elderly and its economic capacity
on the other hand. As the proportion of one-child families
increases, in about 20 to 30 years each couple will have to take
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care of over four old people. 49 This will cause frustration and
conflict in families and affect family relationships, and reduce
old people's welfare and sense of security, and reduce the
productivity of the young people. The negative impact has
already become reality and has attracted nationwide concern.
The most important thing for the old is security, but the
existing pension system applies only to State- and collective-
owned enterprises and institutions. Farmers and other individual
laborers depend on their descendants. Moreover, the majority of
China's old population is in rural areas, and they rely upon
their families to assume the major responsibilities for the care
of them. The rationality and the reason for this situation are
not the objectives of this paper, but this reality is a challenge
to the current population policy and social security system. The
overall trend of population aging is: urban areas prior to rural
areas, coastal provinces prior to inland provinces, and inland
provinces prior to remote provinces. Such a sophisticated trend
and differentiation gives the government a more sophisticated and
challenging issue in building up its security system to face the
aging population. To attain both population control and old age
support, non-family based options for elderly support need to be
explored. Some meaningful linkages between family and government
elderly support need to be established. A critical policy issue
49
. Lei Jeqiong, "Change of Urban Family and Old Life",
People's Daily
. (Overseas Edition), August 16, 1986, (in
Chinese)
.
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in China is what the optimal combination of both types of support
system should be.
As an alternative to the above problem, some people suggest
that China develop old folks' homes and apartments. However, at
the moment, there are only 20,000 old folks' homes across the
nation, a far from sufficient number.
My speculation is that instead of monopolizing all the
economic activities, the government may give individuals more
freedom and space to make their own decisions based on market
supply and demand. It is impossible for the central government
to put every aspect of the economic and social activities into a
perfect plan, nor can the government find sufficient funds to
finance all it needs and wants to do. The law of supply and
demand will teach people how to fulfill their needs quickly and
efficiently, if the government can stand at the right position to
support and adjust the process. Instead of treating services for
old people as a non-profit activity which has to be offered by
the government, it may not be a bad idea to make it a new
business.
Chinese scientists and government leaders have accepted the
fact that it is inevitable and irreversible that China will reach
an aging population period in 1990s and that this trend will
accelerate in early next century. 50 The current one-child
50
. Yang Taoyuan, "China is Facing the Challenge of Aging
Population", Outlook Weekly , (Overseas Edition), No. 30, July
28, 1986, (in Chinese).
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policy is the main cause of the aging population. 51 According to
another official prediction, in the year of 2000, China will have
130 million old people over 60 years. 52 However, mistakes of the
past give us a buffer period. From now to the end of this
century, those born during the baby boom in 1960s will enter into
labor force. Such a huge base can slow down the aging population
process. Therefore, this period can be considered to be the
"golden period" in which age composition is favorable to economic
development because the ratio of young and old dependents
combined to the working age population is rather low. If we can
take this opportunity to expand production and improve social
security and welfare system, we can set a material base and will
be in better shape when we face the challenge of accelerating
aging population. This again depends upon a more open and
liberal economic environment. The government must manage to
expand the present economic and political reform toward a more
market-oriented economy.
Another problem the government should solve in order to
effectively encourage voluntary birth control is to assure the
availability of non-abortion contraceptive tools. Currently,
many couples find it hard to believe that contraceptives are so
hard to find when they hear that birth-control products are
51
. Wang Wei, Director of the State Family Planning
Commission, "China's Population Control Policy and Aging
Population", Outlook Weekly
. (Overseas Edition), Vol. 30, July
28, 1986, (in Chinese).
52
. According to journalists' report, People's Daily ,
(Overseas Edition), October 31, 1987, (in Chinese).
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piling up in factory warehouses. This problem is caused by the
disequilibrium between production and distribution. An official
of the State Family Planning Commission said "China is not short
of family planning products. In fact, supply exceeds demand." 53
Take condoms for example. The country had 600 million in stock
by the end of 1985. However distribution is poor and a condom
factory in Dalian, Liaoning province, was facing bankruptcy as
supplies pile up in their warehouse. The problem of "shortage"
of contraceptives does not lie in production but in distribution
and the service sector. In China, contraceptives are distributed
free to the public through two channels: chemist shops run by
pharmaceutical companies or neighborhood family planning
committees and those in workplaces. Since the contract
responsibility system was introduced in drug stores in some
areas, many of the goods that do not earn profits have been taken
off the shelves and put in some inconspicuous place. People who
are too shy to ask cannot find them. Formerly most chemists
displayed contraceptives openly so that people could help
themselves. Effort needs to be made to make contraceptives
readily available to those who are willing to use family
planning.
3. DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION
Rational consideration of population policy in China must
53
. "Contraceptives in Abundance-But Where?", China Daily ,
Vol. 5, No. 1051, May 17, 1986.
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consider the spatial distribution of the population. In China,
as in other nonindustrial countries, population settlement
originally followed arable land, and the topography and climate
so limit the area on which different crops can be grown that only
a small proportion of the total territory is at present
cultivated. As the result, about ninety-five percent of total
population live on less than forty percent of the land. The most
densely populated areas cover most of the Yangtze delta region
and the Northern China plain. From table 14 we can see that the
least densely populated provinces—Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang and
Inner Mongolia—contains almost half of the total area of the
country but only about four percent of the total population,
while in some of those most densely populated provinces such as
Jiangsu and Shandong the distribution density is close to that of
a metropolitan city. Table 14 presents the overall provincial
densities. In order to show the uneven regional population
distribution, we employ the technique of Lorenz Curve in figure
10 . The computation procedure is shown in notes to table 14
.
The Lorenz Curve in the figure shows a substantial uneven
distribution of China's population over the total area of China.
The geographical distribution of a population depends on
both natural factors (climate and landforms) and cultural
factors. 54
54
. Adopted from The Determinants and Consequences of
Population Trends . United Nations, Series A, Population Studies,
No. 17. 1953, p. 163-180, with some additions and other changes.
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Table 14. Computation of Concentration Ratio of Regional
Population Distribution in 1983
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Nation 102,495 9,600 107 1 1 - -
Tibet 193 1,200 1.6 0.002 0.125 .002 0.13
Qinghai 393 720 5.4 0.004 0.075 0.01 0.20
Xinjiang 1,318 1,600 8.2 0.013 0.167 0.02 0.37
Inner
Mongolia 1,955 1,200 17 0.019 0.125 0.04 0.49
Gansu 1,988 450 44 0.019 0.047 0.06 0.54
Ningxia 398 60 60 0.004 0.006 0.06 0.54
Heilong-
jiang 3,306 460 70 0.032 0.048 0.09 0.59
Yunnan 3,319 390 84 0.032 0.041 0.13 0.63
Jilin 2,270 180 121 0.022 0.019 0.15 0.65
Shannxi 2,931 200 143 0.029 0.021 0.18 0.67
Guangxi 3,733 230 162 0.036 0.024 0.21 0.70
Shanxi 2,572 156 165 0.025 0.016 0.24 0.71
Guizhou 2,901 170 165 0.028 0.018 0.27 0.73
Sichuan 10,076 560 178 0.098 0.058 0.36 0.79
Jiangxi 3,384 160 203 0.033 0.017 0.40 0.81
Fujian 2,640 120 218 0.026 0.013 0.42 0.82
Liaoning 3,629 140 249 0.035 0.015 0.46 0.83
Hubei 4,835 180 258 0.047 0.019 0.51 0.85
Hunan 5,509 210 262 0.054 0.022 0.56 0.87
Guangdong 6,075 210 287 0.059 0.022 0.62 0.90
Hebei 5,420 180 289 0.053 0.019 0.67 0.91
Anhui 5,056 130 363 0.049 0.014 0.72 0.93
Zhej iang 3,963 100 389 0.039 0.010 0.76 0.94
Henan 7,591 167 455 0.074 0.017 0.83 0.96
Shandong 7,564 150 494 0.074 0.016 0.91 0.97
Beijing 934 16.8 556 0.009 0.002 0.92 0.97
Jiangsu 6,135 100 598 0.060 0.010 0.98 0.98
Tianjin 789 11.3 697 0.008 0.001 0.98 0.98
Shanghai 1,194 6.2 1,926 0.012 0.001 1.00 0.99
Notes: (1) : Units at the Provincial Leve]
(2).: Total Population (times 104 )
.
(3): : Area(l,000 sq.km)
.
(4) : Population Density (persons / sq.km) .
(5). : Proportion of Areas to the Total Area.
(6). : Proportion of Populations to the Total Population.
(7) : Cumulative Proportions of Areas to the Total Area.
(8) : Cumulative Proportions of Population to the Total
Population.
Source: China Statistical Year Book. 1984.The State
Statistical Bureau, (in Chinese)
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The cultural factors modify the effects of the natural and
the physical factors, and all of them operate through the
demographic factors. Many parts of China are hilly and
mountainous, or consist of generally flat to rolling desert
plains. The climate is highly diverse, ranging from tropical and
subtropical in the Southern provinces such as Guangdong, to
subarctic in the extreme Northeastern provinces such as
Heilongjiang, thus giving some parts intense summer heat and
others long winters with only relatively short growing seasons.
Some provinces in the Northwest are quite arid and not favorable
for agriculture.
In addition to topography and climate, the cultural and
social structure and tradition have worked against extensive
long distance migration. The economic factors are also important
for people when they make migration decision. Only an unusual
attraction or a severe crisis can induce such a decision.
The Chinese government has realized the necessity of
population redistribution and has tried several policies. From
1960 to 1966 and continuing during the ten-year Cultural
Revolution period (1966-1976) , millions of persons, particularly
youths, were sent to countryside under the propaganda slogan of
"concentrate forces on strengthening the agricultural front" and
"it is necessary for educated young people to go to the
countryside and be re-educated by the poor and low-middle class
farmers". Although the intentions of Chairman Mao Zedong, the
Party and the government, and the effort and contribution of
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those who were sent to countryside should be appreciated,
generally speaking the policy as a whole failed, and the
remaining problems left many families and the government with
trouble. The reason is that those population redistribution
movements were supported only by political and spiritual beliefs.
Although these beliefs are sometimes beautiful, some are against
human nature, and will not last long and will eventually fail.
For most of those who were forced to migrate to the countryside
by political and official pressure instead of spiritual belief,
crisis was implied at the very beginning. Experience proved that
without economic incentive, and without the hope of prosperity
for their own sake in the short run, people will not be willing
to take the risk and give up their current opportunity in cities
or more developed areas. In the long run, everything could be
beautiful, but because in order to reach the beautiful long run
goal, people have to make painful sacrifice in the short run, or
even in several generations, it is very unlikely that they will
take it. Only short-run incentives have significant impact on
people s decision-making
.
Recently, since the Party and the government took new
economic policy in agricultural sectors, many former farmers have
left their homelands and have shifted from traditional
agricultural activities to business activities. Some of them
even started their businesses in those provinces where few people
were willing to go, such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet. The
problem is that these people are suspicious of the new policy and
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are not sure how long the policy will last. They are scared
because of past policy changes, and the discrimination against
private ownership. The reward for their risk-taking is not
legally protected. Therefore they are reluctant to invest the
gain they have received in the poor areas to set up permanent
businesses which will create employment opportunities in those
areas and attract more migrants, and they are certainly not going
to get the whole family to settle in the new area permanently.
And since land is legally owned by the country, no farmers have
the incentive to cultivate new land. Thus no large scale
voluntary migration can take place.
As for professional manpower, there is less economic
incentive to attract them to the less developed regions. The
whole salary system is under the state planning, and salaries of
different persons at the same rank are almost the same with only
a very insignificant regional compensation. Because the
government and the Party encourage people to plant their roots in
the countryside, in boundary areas, and in poor and less
developed areas, once professionals have left their urban life
style, it is very difficult for them to go back to their homeland
and to get back their former jobs55 . Thus professional workers
have no voluntary will to go to those areas.
In order to solve this problem, it is essential to promote
55
. In China people are not allowed to move and settle in
another place without official permission and registration. Job
assignment for professional and educated people are also made by
the government.
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more open and liberal economic policy, as discussed above, and to
legally protect private ownership. Risk-taking should be
encouraged and rewarded. High compensation will encourage
professionals to give up their urban life and jobs in more
developed areas, so local government, institutions, and
businesses should be given more authority to offer higher
compensation and better living condition in order to attract
skilled workers and professionals. Those willing to contribute
to the less developed areas for short time but not willing to
settle permanently should be given the freedom and convenience to
go and return. 56 To promote migration to Tibet and other less
developed provinces in order to reduce population pressure and to
help economic development in these areas, more economic
incentives are needed. These incentives could include government
support program and improvements to schools, hospitals,
transportation systems and others public facilities. 57
56
. It should be mentioned that recently many people
worldwide have expressed concerns about China's internal
migration to some less developed regions, including Tibet. Their
concerns include the fear that such migrations will exploit
resources in these areas, interrupt the natural progress of
social and economic structure, and will have harmful effect on
the economic development in these regions. The situation is not
that those people go to Tibet to take advantage of that area.
Instead, they are either assigned by the government to serve
there temporarily, or are voluntarily willing to contribute to
the people there. The numbers are so small that it has not
reduced the population pressure in other areas.
57
. The Chinese government's efforts and projects aiming to
promote economic transformation and development in Tibet and
other less developed provinces were quite successful in the past
and were appreciated by the residents in those areas, though
there are still many improvements to be made in order to achieve
more efficient result.
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4. SHORT-TERM POPULATION POLICY
In 1986, the World Bank published its population
projection58 . The projection of China's population indicates
that Chinese population will reach the stationary level in about
2010, represented by Net Reproduction Rate(NRR) 59 equal to 1, and
fertility, or Gross Reproduction Rate(GRR) , equal to 2.1. This
result almost coincides with the 100-year projection with N=2
,
reported earlier. Combining the World Bank projection and the
results of the 100-year projection discussed in chapter 5, and
considering factors such as total labor force and dependency
ratio and their impact upon economic development, we may conclude
that the optimal control target of the crucial variable N should
be set between 1.5 and 2.0. Our target is to adjust the
population policy and control the total population into the
region bounded by the two curves representing the population
growth trends with N=1.5 and N=2.0, respectively. We can assume
another approach, that is, to set our control range as 1.0<N<1.5.
These two assumptions are illustrated in figure ll. 60 As we
58
. "World Population Projections, 1985. Short- and Long-
Term Estimates by Age and Sex with Related Demographic
Statistics". From the data files of The Word Bank. The Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, p. 272-273.
59
. The NRR measures the extent to which women reproduce
themselves under given fertility and mortality conditions. A
NRR=1 means that women simply reproduce themselves. In other
words, each woman during her reproductive years produces one
female child. A stationary population is represented by NRR=1.
In this paper, the N can be seen as gross reproduction rate(GRR)
.
The assumption of N=GRR=1 can be translated as equal to NRR=0.5.
60
. Figure 11 is constructed with data from table 6, 7, and
8.
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discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5, this approach will meet
challenge in practice in the short-run and face problem in
reaching sustained development in the long-run, therefore is not
realistic. From figure 3, we have already seen the negative
effect of the radical population policy. 61
61
. Although many factors can affect infant mortality, if
we review the political, economic and social conditions, we have
sufficient reason to believe that the main reason is the
population policy.
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A main challenge to this conclusion could be summarized as
follows: the larger the population size, the lower the income
per capita, holding other factors constant. This is the effect
on consumption side. This proposition can also be supported by
the law of diminishing returns, which is the effect on production
side. I imagine that the Chinese policy makers designed the one-
child-per-family policy based on the above propositions.
However, readers might realize also that this challenge relies
entirely upon the assumption of ceteris paribus. What is being
held constant here includes capital and total output. We may
think about what China would have been like if its population had
never exceeded the population size of 2 million in Shang Dynasty
in 1000 B.C.. We may also realize the fact that some countries
with the highest population density on the earth are among the
most developed countries. Adding more people to a population
while holding the pie fixed directly reduces everyone's share,
and indirectly affects consumption through the effect on
production per worker. Under the current one-child-per-family
policy and based on the projection of dependency ratio reported
earlier, if the total population declines sharply, total
production may go down, and it is not quite sure that GNP per
capita can be higher under the high dependency ratio, or high
enough to compensate the lost social welfare. As we saw in
chapter five, in one of our projections (the N=l assumption) , the
increase of output per worker is about the same proportion as the
decrease in output per dependent, when dependency ratio is 1.483.
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Our projections of output per capita indicated that the current
population policy will give not only a much smaller total output,
but also a lower per capita output in the long-run. The
fertility assumption N=1.5 gives the highest per capita output
among all assumptions.
Income per capita depends upon the amount of capital
available for each worker, though not entirely. Given a constant
capital stock, a decrease of population and thereafter labor
force will increase proportionally the amount of capital
available per worker. But the assumption that income and capital
are fixed, instead of variable in response to the number of
people, is very unrealistic. People with more children tend to
forego some current consumption in order to save for their
children's future needs, such as education and marriage. 62 Thus,
"Population growth is likely to have a positive effect on this
sort of saving, and hence upon the community's stock of
capital." 63 Our projections in chapter five prove that under
strict one-child-per-family policy, total capital will decline
substantially.
We have discussed that Chinese economy is generally speaking
represented by labor-intensive technology. We need to keep
sufficient labor force to operate this labor intensive economy.
62
. This does not lead to the proposition that more
children necessarily means more saving, just like a reduction of
children does not necessarily mean an increase of saving.
63
. Julian L. Simon, The Economics of Population Growth ,
Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1977. p. 34.
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Thus we cannot afford a sharp decrease of population. This does
not mean that China should keep this labor intensive structure
and bring this backwardness of the past to the future. This is
not the preference. Instead, this is a painful reality China has
to face. Before the structural transformation of technology has
naturally occurred, a sharp decline of population and labor
force, and increase of dependency ratio, will lead the economy to
a hard situation, as reported in chapter 5.
Even if we assume that a one-child-per-family policy can
successfully increase GNP per capita, we need to recognize that
social welfare is the function of many factors, not only
disposable income per head, but also family life, love to and
from children, personal integrity, etc.. We cannot measure the
net gain or loss of welfare of a policy quantitatively, but if
most people are not happy about the effect of the policy, we have
reason to challenge it. Population policy is the type of policy
which has impact upon almost every family, even those who choose
to have one or no child. If this policy cannot lead to optimal
social welfare, we cannot consider it as the best alternative.
Finally, the one-child-per-family policy itself has already
been proved to be unpractical by past experience. If China has
unlimited resource, then there is no need for a family planning
program. People can have as many children as they want. On the
other hand, if the one-child-per-family policy can successfully
achieve sustained economic development, increase aggregate social
welfare and be implemented without so many difficulty, resistance
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and human misery, there is no argument either. But when
sustained economic development, increased level of material
wellbeing, optimal social welfare, and human rights are all
desired, a tough trade-off has to be made.
With respect to the population policy, we may suggest that
the government legally allow each couple to have two and only two
children. Those who decide to have one or no child should be
encouraged with high compensation, because with the given
contribution they make to the society, they take a smaller share
from the society, and the society should let the parents share
the external welfare the parents contributed to the society. The
opposite is also true. Since in China, many public services and
social security benefits are available to the public free or at
low charge, 64 those who choose to have more than two children
will take larger share at the expense of others 1 relative low
share, and they should be charged with substantially high
economic penalty. 65 In this way, the society can shift the
external cost of additional child to the internal cost of parents
who choose to have more than two children. As we discussed in
64
. Actually nothing is "free". Since China's income
distribution system is based on Marxist distribution theory,
deductions are made by the central government "for workers'
interest" before employees get their share, therefore employees
and their families are entitled to public services with good quality.
65
. It is not unreasonable to assume that after a couple
have the second child, the marginal utility of the third child is
lower than the first and even lower than the second, and the
elasticity of demand should be also fairly high. Thus the
economic penalty should be high enough to show the government '
s
principle and policy, and to compensate the society.
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the first section of this chapter, when the level of education
and standard of living increase, the opportunity cost for parents
to have children will be higher and many may not want to have two
children. It is my belief that both the current population
pressure and the state of human right, people's overall welfare
should be taken into account, given my standpoint that population
control is very important and necessary.
It should also be pointed out that the current one-child-
per-family policy may not be favorable for children's sake. In
1986 there were 35,000,000 one-child families. The "only-child
problem" has drawn national concern. These children have obvious
weaknesses in personality, characteristics, social attitude
behavior, and interpersonal relationship. These children tend to
have a higher possibility of having psychological problems than
children from non-one-child family. Parents, teachers and social
workers are deeply concerned about this problem. Many wonder if
these children can become psychologically healthy citizens and
the type of people the parents and the society expect and need. 66
66
. According to journalists' report, People's Daily,
(Overseas Edition) , May 26, 1986, (in Chinese)
.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCIUSION
The introduction of the one-child-per-family policy in China
in 1979 gave rise to a good deal of controversy. Although the
net natural growth of population has been declining, and the
achievements are appreciated, there have been frequent violation
of human rights and associated human misery. These violations
are hurting China's international image.
The negative impact of rapid population growth is clear.
Without population control, China will stay at the subsistence
level of income forever. However, a sharp decline in total
population, which is the end result of a one-child policy, will
also hamper China's economic development. The disadvantages of
the one-child-per-family policy can be summarized as follows:
1) With the one-child-per-family policy, China may face
the danger of shortage of labor force when China is seeking
sustained economic development. If the one-child policy can be
successfully implemented, China's total population in 2080 will
be less than 370 million, with 55 percent old dependents. This
will put the national economy in a hard situation. The result of
this projection looks unrealistic; that is because the policy
itself is not realistic and not practical.
2) The current policy will accelerate the process of
aging population. A high dependency ratio will put pressure on
105
the society. Even more, if old people mainly contribute to the
high dependency ratio, it will cause some economic pressure and
social conflict. Until China has built up a more complete social
security system, most people still need to have more than one
child to assure security. Based on our projection assuming each
couple has only one child, the dependency ratio in the year 2080
will be 1.48, with 203 million old dependents and 18 million
young dependents, provided for by only 149 million people of
working age. Even if Chinese government loosens the restriction
some time later, the first round effect will only increase the
dependency ratio, since the people added to the population as the
result of a higher fertility level are children, if we assume
there is no increase of old people mortality. This will increase
the economic pressure on the working population.
3) The strict one-child policy will not only decrease total
output, but will also slow down capital stock accumulation and
per capita output growth in the long-run, compared to the policy
effects under more moderate population growth. Instead of
achieving sustained economic development, the result of this
policy is harmful to Chinese economic development.
3) The strict enforcement of the one-child-per-family
policy will cause human misery. The reappearance of female
infanticide is the direct result of the new policy. Without a
policy change, this trend will cause sex ratio to lose balance.
4) The policy will have a negative impact on children.
The one-child families are facing educational problems and
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frustration to parents, grandparents, children and society.
In sum, the most uncertain consequences of Chinese
population policies lie in the political, economic and social
sphere. If the social security system is not well instituted, or
if the economic incentive fails to materialize, serious
disillusionment could pervade Chinese society, complicating any
successful struggles or economic crises that may occur. The
changes in the family resulting from the sudden imposition of the
one-child-per-family limit on a society with traditional values
and with economic needs to have more than one child could cause
changes in socialization and in attitudes toward government and
the party. By the time these consequences are visible, there may
be little that can be done to overcome them.
To solve the Chinese population problem, we need to take
into account both economic development target and human right,
which will also affect the aggregate social welfare. In order to
promote voluntary, non-abortion family planning, several steps
should be taken:
1) Increase educational level of the whole population. Our
table 13 indicates that there is clear correlation between
education and fertility, and the number of children per couple is
negatively related to the parents' education level. This
suggests that education is an important factor in child-bearing
decision, since education can affect parents' opportunity cost
for children.
2) Increase productivity and build a solid material
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base. We showed that one important factor contributing to
parents' preference in China, particularly in rural areas, is the
relatively low level of economic activity. The opportunity cost
of having children is negatively related to the number of
children parents are willing to have. As people become more
productive, and their economic opportunities increase, their
opportunity cost to have children will increase, and they will
voluntarily accept family planning.
3) Improve social welfare and security system, and make
efficient use of these public facilities. At present in China
the majority of old people are taken care of by their family
members. A well-developed non-family social security system will
assure security through society, rather than mainly through the
family security system, and will thus reduce the need for more
children, thereby reducing the problem of female infanticide.
4) Our study shows that the current Chinese population
demographic distribution is fairly uneven. To relieve the
current and potential population pressure, the government should
encourage voluntary internal migration with government support
and economic incentive. Given proper incentives, such internal
migrations are possible, and this will make a smooth and slow
population growth in the short-run acceptable.
5) In order to solve the population problem ultimately and
to fulfill the above steps, the government should introduce and
assure a more open and liberal economic policy, and promote a
market-oriented economy. As economic development occurs,
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demographic transition will occur. One important factor
affecting parents' preference for children is the opportunity
cost of their time. Economic policy will indirectly induce
parents to voluntarily have fewer children.
As a temporary compromise, the short-term population policy
should allow the maximum of two children, while encourage one-
child family. In order to keep population from growing fast, the
government should promote voluntary family planning program,
assure the availability of contraceptive devices, compensate
one-child families, and put economic penalty on parents who
choose to have more than two children. Overall, a smooth and
slow population growth is preferable to a sharp decline.
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ABSTRACT
Since 1979, China has made significant achievement in
population control program. The net natural growth rate has
successfully gone down. However, with the introduction of
mandatory one-child-per-family policy, violation of human right,
coercion, and most important, forced abortion and female
infanticide reappeared. This has also drawn worldwide concern.
People's preference for more children and for son should be
viewed as the result of particular culture and economic
condition. Without a we11-developed social security system,
people have to have more children to ensure the security of the
family.
The current Chinese population has a young structure. A
radical policy will cause shortage of labor in the near future.
It will also speed up the process of aging population, which will
put pressure on the society. The resistance to the policy causes
people to practice abortion and female infanticide. This brings
many psychological and social problems and is causing imbalance
of sex ratio. In addition, the one-child-per-family policy has
many disadvantages in children's development.
The population projection and output per capita projection
based on different fertility assumptions indicate that one-child
policy will not lead to optimal outcome. The study also
indicates that one-child policy cannot optimize aggregate social
welfare.
In order to promote voluntary family planning program, we
should increase the overall education level, adopt more open and
liberal economic policy. As people become more productive, their
preference for children will decline. We also need to improve
the social security system. In order to release the current and
potential population pressure, we should encourage voluntary
internal migration. In addition to economic incentive, the
government should provide infrastructure support and most
important, legal protection of their reward.
At present, a more practical alternative policy is to allow
each couple to have two children, while encourage one-child
family. High compensation should be offered to those who choose
to have one or no child, and high penalty to those who have more
than two children, in order to assure social justice.

